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THE PRACTICE AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION
David I. Walker *

ABSTRACT
Although nonqualified deferred compensation plans lack explicit tax
preferences afforded qualified plans, it is well understood that nonqualified
deferred compensation results in a joint tax advantage when employers earn a
higher after-tax return on deferred sums than employees could achieve on their
own. Several commentators have proposed tax reform aimed at leveling the
playing field between cash and nonqualified deferred compensation, but reform
is not easily achieved. This Article examines the stakes. It investigates private
sector nonqualified deferred compensation practices and shows that joint tax
minimization often takes a backseat to accounting priorities and participant
diversification concerns. In practice, the largest source of joint tax advantage
likely stems from use of corporate owned life insurance (COLI) to informally
fund nonqualified deferred compensation liabilities, suggesting that narrow
reform aimed at COLI use might be a more attractive policy response than
fundamental reform of the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation.
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Nonqualified Deferred Compensation

Introduction
Executives and other high-level corporate employees often receive
compensation relating to current services that is payable in future years. This
deferred compensation might consist of “long-term” incentive compensation (both
equity and non-equity based arrangements) that generally pays out several years
after grant. Compensation also may be deferred through qualified plans, explicitly
tax-preferred arrangements that include traditional, qualified defined-benefit
pension plans and qualified defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)s. 1 This
article focuses on a third class of deferred compensation writ large, the nonqualified
analogs of qualified plans, generally referred to as nonqualified deferred
compensation. 2
Nonqualified deferred compensation plans have a long history in the U.S. and
they remain popular today. 3 These plans take a variety of forms, including both
defined-benefit and defined-contribution arrangements.
Often these plans
supplement or extend the benefits provided to qualified plan participants, but this is
not always the case. Perhaps most familiar are elective deferred compensation
plans, which allow participants to defer a portion of their salary, bonus, or other
compensation, and defer the tax on that compensation, until a future date, often
until retirement. 4

As discussed infra Part I.A., participants in defined benefit plans are promised specified
benefits at retirement, e.g., an annuity equal to a percentage of pre-retirement wages;
defined contribution plans specify annual contributions that yield benefits at retirement
that depend on the investment choices of the parties.
2 There is no authoritative definition of nonqualified deferred compensation. I.R.C. § 409A
defines a nonqualified deferred compensation plan as any plan providing for the deferral of
compensation other than a qualified plan. I.R.C. § 409A(d)(1) (2012). Under this definition,
stock options and other long-term equity-based pay would be considered nonqualified
deferred compensation. The present Article, however, generally excludes equity incentive
pay from the definition of nonqualified deferred compensation, in keeping with more
standard industry terminology.
3 Approximately three quarters of large companies offer nonqualified deferred
compensation programs currently. DOUG FREDERICK & AARON PEDOWITZ, MERCER, MARKET
LANDSCAPE OF EXECUTIVE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 2 (Feb. 26, 2016) (reporting that 73% of Fortune
500 companies offered nonqualified savings plans in 2015); THE NEWPORT GROUP, EXECUTIVE
BENEFITS: A SURVEY OF CURRENT TRENDS 13 (2014/2015 Edition) [hereinafter Newport Group
Survey] (72% of Fortune 1000 companies offered a nonqualified savings plan in 2013).
Some governmental entities and other tax-exempt organizations also offer nonqualified
savings opportunities.
The use of nonqualified deferred compensation by these
organizations is not a focus of this Article.
4 Taxation is deferred only if the terms of the deferred compensation arrangement do not
run afoul of the constructive receipt, cash equivalence, and economic benefit doctrines, and,
since 2004, the requirements of I.R.C. § 409A. See infra text accompanying notes 40-47.
1
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Although nonqualified deferred compensation plans lack explicit tax
preferences afforded qualified plans, 5 it is well understood that nonqualified
deferred compensation can be tax advantaged in some circumstances. The
comparison that is generally made is between 1) a payment of current cash
compensation that is taxed to the employee and deducted by the employer, followed
by employee investment of the after-tax amount until some future date and 2)
deferral of current compensation, investment by the employer, and payout at a
future date resulting at that time in taxation of the employee and a deduction for the
employer. Ignoring potential changes in tax rates over time, nonqualified deferred
compensation results in a joint (sometimes called “global”) tax advantage to an
employee and employer if the employer is able to earn a higher after-tax rate of
return than the employee is able to earn on her own. 6 This circumstance can arise
any time that the employer’s tax rate on an investment is less than the employee’s
rate on the same investment (assuming both can access the investment), but is
particularly pronounced when the investment under consideration is in the
employer’s own stock. In that case, an employee would be taxed with respect to her
outside investment in her own company’s stock at the regular rates applied to
dividends and capital gains, but a firm faces no tax on gains or losses on holdings of
its own stock under a particular rule of the federal income tax code, IRC § 1032. 7
Participants in defined contribution nonqualified deferred compensation
plans generally are permitted to control the notional investment of their account
balances, similar to the way in which participants manage 401(k) investments, but
these notional investments and the actual investments of deferred amounts by
employer sponsors, if any, are not disclosed to investors. 8 Finance theory suggests
that poorly diversified executives should not voluntarily tie nonqualified deferred
compensation account balances to their own companies’ stock prices. 9 However,
recent scholarship suggests that they often do so 10 and that employers commonly
invest deferred amounts in their own stock, as well. 11 If so, and given § 1032,

Qualified plan taxation is discussed infra Part I(A).
Infra Part I(C).
7 Infra Part I(C). The joint tax advantage is also large in cases in which the plan sponsor is
tax exempt or effectively tax exempt. However, employees of governmental and non-profit
entities have only limited access to tax deferred savings opportunities. Infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
8 The term “notional investment” refers to the fact that nonqualified plan participants do
not direct the investment of any actual assets but instead select a benchmark or
benchmarks for the determination of the amounts contractually due to them at payout.
Infra Part I(B).
9 Infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
10 Robert J. Jackson & Colleen Honigsberg, The Hidden Nature of Executive Retirement Pay,
100 VA. L. REV. 479, 492 (2014).
11 Michael Doran, The Puzzle of Non-Qualified Retirement Pay: Optimal Contracting,
Managerial Power, and Taxes 28 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper Series 2016-13, Working Paper, Feb. 1, 2016).
5
6
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nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements could be generating significant
joint tax benefits for participants and employers, and these joint tax benefits might
justify a change in the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation, as several
commentators have proposed. 12

But there are obstacles to reforming the taxation of nonqualified deferred
compensation, 13 and, against that backdrop, this Article investigates the strength of
the driving force behind tax reform. It asks whether private sector nonqualified
deferred compensation plans are being operated in such a way as to generate joint
tax advantages, subsidizing the compensation of high-income individuals, and
potentially distorting executive pay arrangements.
This Article investigates notional participant investment of nonqualified
deferred compensation balances, actual employer investment of deferred amounts,
and other facts on the ground that allow one to assess the joint tax consequences of
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements as they currently function. 14
Insights are derived from several industry surveys and proxy statement disclosures,
as well as interviews with a number of individuals with extensive experience in the
design and administration of nonqualified deferred compensation plans. Key
findings, and implications, include the following: 15
•

•

Notional investment by nonqualified deferred compensation plan
participants in the stock of their own companies appears to be modest, and
employer informal funding of nonqualified deferred compensation liabilities
with own-company stock even more so. As a result, § 1032 apparently
provides little joint tax advantage for nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements.
Corporate owned life insurance (COLI) products are used to informally fund
a quarter or more of aggregate nonqualified deferred compensation account
balances. COLI use can result in a large joint tax advantage, but the tax
advantage is offset to some degree by the cost of insurance and
administrative costs.

See Michael Doran, Executive Compensation Reform and the Limits of Tax Policy, THE
URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., Nov. 2004, at 14; Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise:
Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 506, 539 (1986); Ethan Yale & Gregg D.
Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 574 (2007);
Daniel I. Halperin & Ethan Yale, Deferred Compensation Revisited 114 TAX NOTES 939, 941
(Mar. 5, 2007).
13 Infra Part II.
14 One might argue that potential joint tax consequences are also important or more
important than actual tax consequences. Infra Part IV(A).
15 Infra Part III.
12
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•

Other nonqualified plan liabilities are funded using taxable securities (often
held in rabbi trusts) or remain unfunded liabilities with the deferred
amounts being used in the business or to reduce borrowing. In either case,
and setting aside employers facing low effective marginal tax rates, the joint
tax consequences range from modest advantage to modest disadvantage and
are likely to be roughly neutral in aggregate.

The joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred compensation do not
appear to be of first order importance in the decision to adopt these plans, and while
certain tax considerations clearly matter in operation (e.g., avoiding tax penalties on
non-complying deferred compensation plans under IRC § 409A), 16 participants and
plan sponsors do not appear to be making investment decisions with a view to
minimizing their joint tax burden. 17 As a result, it is not clear that fundamental
reform of nonqualified deferred compensation is required. A more surgical
approach targeting the use of COLI might be a better response. 18

Why don’t firms and employees make tax-minimizing investment decisions
within nonqualified deferred compensation programs? It appears that financial
accounting and participant diversification concerns often trump joint taxminimization. 19 In elective defined contribution plans, participants tend to select
diversified equity and debt funds that create volatile liabilities on corporate
financial statements. To the extent that they informally fund their obligations
within these plans, sponsors tend to mirror the aggregate notional investment
choices of participants in order to hedge their economic exposure, as well as
financial statement volatility, even when the joint tax consequences are neutral or
disadvantageous. Notional participant investment in own-company stock, by
contrast, undermines participant diversification needs and also creates liabilities
that cannot be perfectly hedged from an income statement perspective. The
combined effect appears to discourage the use of own-company stock in such plans.
But what about firms that face a low effective marginal rate because of
accumulated losses? These firms could invest deferred participant dollars in
essentially any manner and create a joint tax advantage. Despite the potential tax
savings, preliminary evidence suggests that nonqualified deferred compensation
participation at these firms is an order of magnitude less than at firms facing high
effective rates. Perhaps the risk associated with an unsecured promise to deliver
deferred compensation outweighs the potential tax savings at these firms.

Infra Part I(C).
As discussed infra Part IV.A.2, extensive use of COLI to informally fund nonqualified
deferred compensation is in itself evidence that the parties often do not minimize joint tax
costs through investment decisions. If firms and participants minimized joint tax through
use of own-company stock, for example, there would be no need to acquire expensive COLI
products.
18 Infra Part IV(A).
19 Infra Part III.
16
17
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Whatever the explanation, low effective rate firms do not appear to be fully
exploiting the nonqualified deferred compensation opportunity.

This Article also considers the distributional consequences of nonqualified
deferred compensation. 20 Despite the lack of a clear joint tax advantage at high tax
firms, this Article argues that the after-tax returns achieved by nonqualified
deferred compensation participants substantially exceed those available on
equivalent outside investments, and that it is unlikely that these effective abovemarket returns are shifted back to firms through other adjustments to
compensation. Shareholders, in other words, likely bear the cost of these abovemarket returns, not the public fisc.

The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an
overview of qualified and nonqualified deferred compensation. Part II briefly
describes the approach and methodology of the present Article. Part III provides
survey and interview evidence concerning nonqualified deferred compensation
practices and uses that evidence to estimate the aggregate joint tax consequences of
nonqualified plans at high rate firms in practice. Part IV discusses the implications
of these findings for high effective rate firms, investigates use of nonqualified
deferred compensation by low rate firms, addresses distributional consequences,
and considers non-joint tax minimization explanations for the persistence of
nonqualified deferred compensation, including path dependence and stealth
compensation for executives. Part V concludes with a call for reassessment of COLI
use and taxation and for enhanced disclosure of effectively above-market
nonqualified deferred compensation returns.
I. Deferred Compensation Overview

This Part begins with a brief description of qualified plans before moving on
to description and overview of the tax, accounting, and governance features of
nonqualified plans. This Part also highlights prior research that addresses the tax
consequences of nonqualified deferred compensation.
A. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans and Taxation

Congress has provided preferential tax treatment for qualified deferred
compensation plans in order to encourage companies to create these plans and to
encourage employees to save for retirement. Qualified plans are intended to be
broadly based and are subject to nondiscrimination requirements21 and limits on

Infra Part IV.B.
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b). These requirements are designed to ensure that plans do not
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 46 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter,
EBRI).
20
21
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contributions, benefits, and the amount of an employee’s compensation that may be
taken into account for purposes of a qualified plan. 22

Qualified plans may be structured as defined benefit (DB) plans or defined
contribution (DC) plans. DB plans promise participants specified benefits at
retirement. Often the benefit is structured as an annuity and represents some
fraction of a participant’s pre-retirement wage rate. 23 The plan sponsor (the
employer) makes contributions to a pension trust and directs the investment of
trust assets to satisfy plan obligations. 24 Participants are essentially passive
beneficiaries.
Defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, also involve contributions
to a trust, but participants generally direct the investment of their own accounts
within the trust based on a menu of investment options provided by the plan
Both participants and employers may make
sponsor and administrator. 25
contributions to DC accounts. Employer contributions often are structured as
matching contributions. Benefits ultimately are a function of the amounts
contributed and the investment choices made by participants.

While qualified DB plans were once very common in the U.S. – and hence
constitute what many older Americans think of as corporate pensions – many firms
have phased out DB plans, generally replacing them with DC plans. 26 At the end of
2015, assets in private qualified DB plans totaled $3.1 trillion, while private
qualified DC assets totaled $5.4 trillion. 27

22 See I.R.C. § 402(g) (2012) (limiting the maximum salary deferral for eligible employees
using tax qualified plans to $18,000); I.R.C. § 414(v) (2012) (allowing for an additional
$6,000 “catch-up” contribution for eligible employees over age 50); I.R.C. 401(a)(17)
(limiting the annual amount of eligible salary to be considered under a tax-advantaged plan
to $265,000); EBRI, supra note 21, at 50. Most, but not all, of these restrictions were
imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
23 EBRI, supra note 21, at 44.
24 Management of trust investments is subject to a general prudent man fiduciary duty
standard; however, ERISA limits investment in plan sponsor stock to 10% of total DB trust
assets. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).
25 401(k) and the nonprofit analog 403(b) plans are perhaps most familiar, but DC plans
also include other profit-sharing plans, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and other
arrangements. EBRI, supra note 21, at 45.
26 DOUG FREDERICK & AARON PEDOWITZ, MERCER, MARKET LANDSCAPE OF EXECUTIVE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS 2 (Feb. 26, 2016) (providing data indicating that 22% of Fortune 500 companies
currently maintain a qualified DB plan that is open to new employees, while 99% offer
qualified DC savings opportunities).
27 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 4TH QUARTER
2015 93 (released Mar. 10, 2016). DB plans have been more persistent in the public sector.
See John G. Kilgour, Section 457 Deferred Compensation Plans, 45 COMP. & BENEFITS REV. 176,
176 (2013) (noting that 87% of state and 83% of local government employees had access to
a traditional DB pension plan in 2010).
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The taxation of qualified DC and DB plans is the same. In a nutshell,
participants can contribute pre-tax dollars to a qualified plan trust. 28 Employer
contributions on behalf of participants are immediately deductible and excludable
by the participants. 29 Trust assets grow tax-free. 30 Participants generally are taxed
at ordinary rates when they receive benefits. 31 As Professors Daniel Halperin and
Alvin Warren have described, the key to the joint tax benefit of qualified deferred
compensation is the exemption from tax of the income and gains that accrue to the
trust between contribution and withdrawal. 32 The deferral of income inclusion by
participants actually has no impact on the joint tax advantage, assuming that tax
rates are unchanged over time. 33
B. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Arrangements

Modestly compensated rank and file employees may be able to secure
adequate retirement income streams through social security and participation in
qualified plans alone, but given the income-based limitations on qualified plan
participation, this is unlikely to be the case for more highly compensated employees
and executives. In order to secure an adequate retirement income, these individuals
must invest additional after-tax dollars on their own account or participate in
company sponsored savings plans that lack the explicit tax preferences of qualified
plans, i.e., nonqualified deferred compensation.

Nonqualified deferred compensation plans come in the same two basic
flavors as qualified plans: defined benefit and defined contribution plans. A
nonqualified DB plan may supplement a qualified DB plan, providing benefits
beyond the limits imposed on qualified plans under the tax code (often called a
supplemental executive retirement plan), or a nonqualified DB plan may exist
BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION ¶ 3.14
(2016), available at Thomson Reuters Checkpoint (citing I.R.C. § 402(a) (2012)).
This paragraph describes the taxation of “conventional” DC plans, such as IRAs and 401k’s.
Under the Roth alternative, participants contribute after-tax dollars, but payouts are free
from tax. It is widely understood that if tax rates are consistent, conventional and Roth
accounts yield equivalent results. See Halperin & Warren, supra note 32, at 325 (also noting
that effective contribution limits differ between Roth and conventional DC plans).
29 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 28, at ¶ 3.14 (citing I.R.C. § 402(a) (2012)).
30 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 28, at ¶ 3.16 (citing I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 501(a)).
31 I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 72(a)(1); EBRI, supra note 21, at 43. There is an exception to ordinary
income tax treatment that applies when participants receive company stock in kind. Infra
note 223.
32 Halperin, supra note 12, at 539; Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. Warren, Understanding
Income Tax Deferral, 67 TAX L. REV. 317, 324 (2014).
33 This counterintuitive result reflects the same mechanism that leads to the equivalence of
Roth and conventional IRAs, under standard assumptions. Halperin & Warren, supra note
32, at 325.
28

8

Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
independently of any qualified plan. Like qualified DB plan participants,
nonqualified DB participants are largely passive beneficiaries. 34

Similarly, a nonqualified DC plan may supplement a company’s 401(k) plan,
or it might exist independently of any qualified plan. Nonqualified DC plans
frequently provide for elective deferrals by executives, but companies may also
match these contributions to some extent or make independent contributions to
nonqualified DC accounts. 35 Account balances – the amounts promised to
participants – rise or fall each year based on the notional “investment” decisions of
participants. These account balances are paid out to participants at a predetermined time or on a pre-determined schedule.

To be clear, unlike the owner of a 401(k) account, a nonqualified DC plan
participant does not direct the investment of actual assets. The notional investment
decisions of nonqualified DC participants simply determine the amounts that plan
sponsors are contractually obligated to deliver at payout. Also, unlike qualified plan
contributions, there is no legal requirement that sponsors of nonqualified DB or DC
plans set aside assets or invest them in any particular fashion.

As detailed below, nonqualified plans lack the tax advantages associated with
qualified plans. Nonetheless, it is common for firms to promise participants similar
or identical benefits. 36 Again, this is simply a contract between participant and firm.
For example, participants in a nonqualified 401(k) match plan may be allowed to
notionally invest their deferred compensation dollars and any company
contributions in the same funds that are available to 401(k) investors and receive
returns on their notional investments that are undiminished by tax during the
deferral period; i.e., tax-free growth. The only limitations on the amount or
percentage of income that may be deferred by nonqualified plan participants are
contractual.
As in the qualified plan world, firms are shifting from nonqualified DB plans
to nonqualified DC plans. These trends are related. A company that discontinues its
qualified pension plan is less likely to maintain a nonqualified supplemental plan.
One source indicates that only 25% of Fortune 500 companies allowed new hires to
participate in nonqualified DB plans in 2015, down from 38% that did so just five
years earlier. 37 Meanwhile, 64% of the Fortune 500 offered a nonqualified DC plan

ROBERT A. MILLER, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 215-16 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds.,
2002).
35 MILLER, supra note 34, at 215-16.
36 MILLER, supra note 34, at 215-16.
37 Mercer, supra note 26, at 2. See also THE NEWPORT GROUP, EXECUTIVE BENEFITS: A SURVEY OF
CURRENT TRENDS 41 (2014/2015 Edition) [hereinafter Newport Group Survey] (30% of
survey respondents report an active DB supplemental plan in 2013; 20% of Fortune 1000
report an active DB supplemental plan).
34
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in 2015. 38 However, given grandfathering, almost half of Fortune 500 executives
continued to accrue benefits in a nonqualified DB plan in 2015. 39
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Taxation

When properly designed, a nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangement results in deferral of participant inclusion (and employer deduction) of
deferred payments until the payments are received. In the interim, the employer
will pay tax at its regular rate on any income arising from its use of the deferred
funds. Several doctrines, including constructive receipt, cash equivalence, and the
economic benefit rule, might be invoked to require employee inclusion in the year of
deferral, or at some point between deferral and payout, if access to deferred
amounts is not sufficiently limited or if the arrangement too closely resembles cash
compensation. 40

In order to achieve tax deferral, a nonqualified deferred compensation
obligation must represent only an “unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money
or property in the future,” 41 and participants must be “general unsecured
creditors” 42 of the employer. In the wake of the Enron fiasco and several other
perceived abuses of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, 43 Congress
enacted legislation in 2004 to tighten the rules and put in place severe penalties for
noncompliance. That legislation, codified as IRC § 409A, constrains the timing of
elective deferrals, how assets are held, and payout decisions. To comply with
§ 409A, deferral elections generally must be made prior to the beginning of the tax
Mercer, supra note 26, at 2. See also Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 13 (78% of
survey respondents and 72% of Fortune 1000 offered a nonqualified DC plan in 2013).
39 Mercer, supra note 26, at 2. Use of nonqualified DB plans is not random. One source
suggested utilities, for example, are more likely to maintain DB plans than other firms.
Telephone Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm (Feb.
17, 2016). Jackson and Honigsberg found that DB obligations constituted 56% of total
public company top 5 executive nonqualified deferred compensation benefits. Robert J.
Jackson & Colleen Honigsberg, The Hidden Nature of Executive Retirement Pay, 100 VA. L.
REV. 479, 492 (2014).
40 Miller, supra note 34, at 259-66; Gregg D. Polsky, Fixing Section 409A: Legislative and
Administrative Options, 57 VILL. L. REV. 635, 638 (2012) (to avoid application of the
constructive receipt doctrine deferral elections must occur before the related services are
performed and must be irrevocable; to avoid application of the economic benefit doctrine,
the participant must remain in the position of a general unsecured creditor).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2014) (excluding such promises from the definition of property,
the transfer of which would be immediately taxable under I.R.C. § 83).
42 This is one of several requirements that must be satisfied to achieve an advance ruling
from the IRS that a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement will not run afoul of
the constructive receipt doctrine. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
43 See Polsky, supra note 40, at 641 for a discussion of purported abuses of nonqualified
deferred compensation at Enron.
38
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year in which the amounts are earned. 44 Payout options are limited to death,
disability, separation from service, change in control, unforeseeable emergency, or a
date or schedule determined at the time of deferral. 45 While § 409A also addresses
funding, 46 for our purposes, it is sufficient to remember that nonqualified deferred
compensation may represent only an unsecured promise to pay and that any funds
backing up such a promise must also be available to a company’s general creditors.
Participants in plans that run afoul of § 409A are subject to taxation of deferred
amounts when they vest and an additional 20% penalty tax on the value of the
deferred compensation. 47

While § 409A is daunting in some respects, the law had no impact on the
underlying economics of nonqualified deferred compensation. 48 Professor Halperin
drew attention to the potential joint tax advantage of the nonqualified deferred
compensation tax regime thirty years ago in his seminal Yale Law Journal article on
taxation and the time value of money. 49 As he demonstrated, the deferral of the
employer’s deduction to match the timing of employee inclusion is insufficient to
eliminate the joint tax advantage of nonqualified deferred compensation. The net
effect of the nonqualified deferred compensation taxation regime (assuming no
change in tax rates 50) is to tax investment returns during the period of deferral at
the employer’s rate rather than at the employee’s rate. 51 As Professors Halperin and
Warren put it in a recent succinct analysis, nonqualified deferred compensation is
tax advantaged under normal assumptions “if the employer earns an after-tax
44I.R.C.

§ 409A(a)(4) (2012). There is an exception for newly hired employees. I.R.C.
§ 409A(a)(4)(B)(ii). In general this requirement is not a change from prior law. Rev. Rul.
60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; see also Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
45 I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(A). As Polsky notes, these distribution rules ensure that deferrals are
essentially irrevocable. See Polsky, supra note 40, at 643.
46 I.R.C. § 409A(b).
47 I.R.C. §409A(a)(1).
48 Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in its Proper
Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 349 (2006); Polsky, supra note 40, at 643.
49 See Halperin, supra note 12, at 540.
50 Although generally difficult to predict, changes in tax rates affect the attractiveness of
nonqualified deferred compensation. Specifically, nonqualified deferred compensation
tends to be preferred over cash from a joint tax perspective if the employee’s tax rate is
expected to be lower at payout than at deferral (either because of a change in the brackets
or one’s position within the brackets) and/or if the employer’s tax rate is expected to be
higher at payout than at deferral. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A
PLANNING APPROACH 183 (2nd ed. 2001). Thus, while a reduction in the corporate tax rate
from 35% to, say, 25% would generally increase the attractiveness of nonqualified deferred
compensation in steady state, the prospect of such a reduction in the future might dampen
appetites for deferred compensation plans today. Executives who expect to have less
income and to face a lower marginal rate in retirement would tend to prefer deferred
compensation, all else being equal.
51 See Halperin, supra note 12, at 539-41. See also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes,
39 NAT’L TAX J. 499 (1986) (generalizing the underlying principle and discussing a number
of applications).
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return on the deferred compensation that is higher than that available to the
employee,” 52 and this view is well accepted. 53

As Halperin noted back in 1986, nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements will be tax advantaged if a plan sponsor is effectively tax exempt
because of excess tax losses. 54 He noted further that other nonqualified deferred
compensation plan sponsors could invest in dividend paying stocks and exclude a
large fraction of dividend income or could invest in their own stock and avoid tax on
appreciation on those shares per § 1032. 55 Viewing these arrangements as
providing an unintended and unwarranted subsidy for high-income taxpayers,
Halperin proposed the adoption of a special tax, payable by employers, on the
investment income generated by nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements, a tax that would replicate the economic impact of accrual taxation 56

52 Halperin & Warren (2014), supra note 32, at 329. Halperin & Warren’s example is
reproduced in the Appendix. Other examples can be found in Halperin, supra note 12, at
519-20; Doran, supra note 12, at 6-7.
53 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 50; Doran, supra note 12, at 1; Yale & Polsky, supra note 12, at
576-78. But see Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62
TAX L. REV. 377, 377 (2009) (arguing that the conventional analysis fails to account for
differences in investment risk within and without nonqualified plans).
This approach to analyzing the joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred
compensation, and conversely, the consequences for the public fisc, is essentially a “passthrough” approach. It assumes that plan sponsors are investing dollars on behalf of
participants and sharing the tax burden in some fashion. There are other frames that may
have different implications for the public fisc. For example, one could view nonqualified
deferred compensation as a tax-advantaged substitute for equity investment. Normally,
profits that are paid out of a company are double taxed – the corporate level tax is combined
with a tax on dividends (with no corporate deduction for dividends paid) – but profits that
are paid out as compensation are only taxed once – the corporate tax is combined with
taxable (and deductible) compensation. The difficult question, which I must leave to future
work, is whether or in what circumstances an “equity substitute” approach is more
appropriate than a “pass-through” approach. This Article will embrace the pass-through
approach that generally undergirds the previous work in this area highlighted in this
section. I thank Dan Halperin for calling my attention to the “equity substitute” approach
and discussing it with me.
54 Halperin, supra note 12, at 540. In 1986, non-governmental tax-exempt entities also
could provide their employees with unlimited tax advantaged nonqualified deferred
compensation (Halperin, supra note 12, at 540), but that situation is more complicated
today. See infra note 180.
55 Halperin, supra note 12, at 540. At the time, corporations could deduct 85% of dividends
received on small holdings of shares of other firms. Today, the general dividend received
deduction is 70%. I.R.C. § 243(a) (2012).
56 Accrual taxation would require assessment and payment of tax on gains and losses
annually, despite the absence of cash flows providing funds to pay the tax.
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and would level the (tax) playing field between current and deferred
compensation. 57

Professors Ethan Yale and Gregg Polsky have worked out the details of a
special tax on nonqualified deferred compensation investment income at length. 58
Yale and Halperin subsequently described the implementation of such a tax as
feasible, but not easy. 59 Professor Michael Doran has proposed application of
accrual taxation to nonqualified deferred compensation, that is, taxation in the year
in which compensation is earned, irrespective of the timing of payout, arguing that
measurement and ability to pay issues are manageable. 60 All of these commentators
agree that § 409A fails to address the fundamental lack of neutrality in the taxation
of current compensation and nonqualified deferred compensation. 61

In a recent working paper, Doran argues that a combination of tax
advantages explains the motivation of firms to employ nonqualified deferred
compensation at least as well as competing explanations. On the specific question of
the joint tax advantage of retirement balances being invested by firms instead of by
executives individually, Doran states that it is “commonplace” for companies to
invest nonqualified defined contribution plan deferrals in their own stock, and that
“this practice has a solid foundation in tax law,” given the fact that firms are not
taxed on gains on their own stock. 62

D. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Accounting

57 Halperin, supra note 12, at 544 (suggesting a special tax on nonqualified deferred
compensation investment income set at the top individual marginal rate).
The joint tax advantage identified by Halperin assumes that employee outside investment
returns are taxed at regular individual rates. As discussed supra note 173 and
accompanying text, individuals can reduce taxes on savings by investing through certain
insurance products. Moreover, as the recent Panama Papers revelations starkly
demonstrate, some wealthy U.S. citizens apparently have minimized or avoided tax on
outside investment through the use of anonymous offshore accounts. Eric Lipton & Julie
Creswell, Panama Papers Show How Rich United States Clients Had Millions Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
5,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/us/panamapapers.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1.
58 Yale & Polsky, supra note 12, at 599.
59 See Halperin & Yale, supra note 12, at 939.
60 Doran, supra note 12, at 15.
61 See Doran, supra note 12, at 1-2; Halperin & Yale, supra note 12, at 941; Polsky, supra note
40, at 639-40; Yale & Polsky, supra note 12, at 574.
62 Doran, supra note 11, at 28. Doran cites Jackson and Honigsberg for the proposition that
firm investment of deferred amounts in company stock is commonplace, but Jackson and
Honigsberg only investigated executive notional investment. Discussion of the taxation of
COLI products, which are often used to informally fund note nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements, is deferred until Part III(C).
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Nonqualified deferred compensation obligations are reflected as liabilities on
corporate balance sheets, and net income is adjusted in each period for increases or
decreases in these liabilities (a process known as “marking to market”). 63 DB
liabilities may fluctuate somewhat with changes in interest rates, but are relatively
stable. 64 DC liabilities, on the other hand, can be highly volatile as a large fraction of
participant balances are notionally invested in equity securities. 65 Employers
cannot formally fund these obligations without jeopardizing participant tax deferral,
but liabilities can be informally funded by setting aside assets in a rabbi trust, a
corporate owned life insurance (COLI) vehicle, or simply in a segregated account, as
long as these funds remain available to general creditors. With one important
exception, firms can hedge the income statement volatility (as well as the economic
risk) that arises from participant notional investments in nonqualified DC plans by
purchasing identical securities with the funds in the rabbi trust, COLI, or segregated
account. The income statement effects of fluctuations in the deferred compensation
liability and the hedge offset. 66

The important exception is company stock. Suppose that an executive
notionally invests her nonqualified DC account balance in own-company stock.
Assuming that the account balance will be paid in cash, gains and losses on that
notional investment must be marked to market in each period as with any other
nonqualified plan liability. 67 Now assume that the company repurchases an
equivalent number of shares in the market or sets aside an equivalent number of
treasury shares, placing these shares in its rabbi trust, COLI, or segregated account.
That hedge will be effective as an economic matter, but it will not offset the income
statement impact of the liability. Gains or losses on shares of a company, held by
that company, even if acquired to hedge obligations such as these, are not reflected
on the income statement. 68 Income statement volatility associated with notional
own-company stock investment can be approximately hedged using a closely

Accounting Standards Codification 710-10-35-4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.). This
statement is true unless the deferral is in the form of company stock, is not diversifiable,
and will be settled using company stock, in which case the obligation is treated as an equity
instrument rather than as a liability. Emerging Issues Tax Force No. 97-14 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd.) [hereinafter EITF No. 97-14].
64 Lee Nunn, “Informal Funding” of NQDC Plans, in TAXATION AND FUNDING OF NONQUALIFIED
DEFERRED COMPENSATION 205 (Marla J. Aspinwall and Michael G. Goldstein, eds., 2d ed. 2012).
65 Nunn, supra note 64, at 204.
66 Nunn, supra note 64, at 200.
Mark-to-market accounting for mutual funds held in
segregated accounts to hedge plan liabilities is not automatic, but requires a sponsor
election. ASC 825-10-25. See also Lee Nunn, Financial Accounting and NQDC, in TAXATION
AND FUNDING OF NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION 296 (Marla J. Aspinwall and Michael
G. Goldstein, eds., 2d ed. 2012). Mark-to-market accounting for COLI gains and losses is
automatic. Accounting Standards Codification 325-30-35-2 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd.); Nunn, supra note 64, at 204.
67 EITF No. 97-14, supra note 63.
68 EITF No 97-14, supra note 63.
See also MULLINTBG, AN OVERVIEW TO DEFERRAL PLAN
NOTIONAL STOCK ACCOUNTING (2014).
63
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correlated security, such as an index, but cannot be perfectly hedged with owncompany stock. 69

This accounting problem arises whenever nonqualified deferred
compensation is notionally invested in own-company stock but payable in cash or is
payable in stock but diversifiable at some point into other investments. In either
case, mark-to-market accounting of the liability is required and no perfect income
statement hedge is available. On the other hand, if an executive defers company
stock in kind, will receive stock in kind, and is not allowed to diversify, mark-tomarket accounting of the obligation is not required, and no income statement
volatility arises. 70
E. Efficient Asset Allocation and Other Features of Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation

While the concerns of nonqualified DB plan participants are essentially
limited to the security of their benefits, DC plan participants are also concerned
about allocating their notional assets in such a way as to maximize the amount of
their benefits while managing investment risks. The investment portfolio
optimizing choices of participants may conflict with tax minimization goals and
accounting concerns.

For example, experts suggest that individuals should invest a relatively large
fraction of retirement savings in equity securities and a relatively small fraction in
debt, particularly when an individual is far from retirement. 71 But participant
notional investment in equities results in greater earnings volatility and generally
poorer joint tax consequences than notional investment in debt securities.

Moreover, while the nonqualified DC joint tax advantage is large when
executives notionally invest in own-company stock and firms hedge with treasury
shares, finance theory suggests that this practice would not be prevalent. Typically,
executives are poorly diversified, with too much of their personal and financial
capital invested in their firms. 72 Of course, firms often compensate these under-

MULLINTBG, BENEFIT TRENDS INSIGHTS, COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK WITH A DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLAN [hereinafter COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK] (noting that the income
statement impact of notional own-company stock investment cannot be adequately hedged
with treasury shares).
70 EITF No. 97-14, supra note 63; COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK, supra note 69.
71 Rules of thumb differ, but one way to get a sense of recommended asset allocations is to
look at the composition of retirement target date funds. For example, Fidelity’s Freedom
Fund targeted at a 40-year-old individual anticipating retirement in 25 years allocates 90%
of investments to equities, while the fund targeted at a 60-year-old anticipating retirement
in 5 years still allocates 60% of investments to equities. See, e.g., Fidelity Freedom Funds,
FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fidelity-fund-portfolios/freedom-funds
(last visited July 26, 2016).
72 Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 26
69
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diversified executives with equity to align incentives with shareholders, but
shareholders pay a cost to induce executives to accept this risky, non-diversifying
pay. 73 It is one thing to ask executives to accept a grant of stock options, which
might only partially replace other compensation; it is another to ask them to defer
current pay into company stock. If given a choice between notional investments,
few well-advised executives would select company stock absent additional
inducements. 74

Related lines of research have considered whether nonqualified deferred
compensation, as an unsecured claim against corporate assets, might serve a
corporate governance function in aligning executive incentives with those of
debtholders, a question that gained increased urgency following the 2008 financial
crisis, 75 or whether nonqualified deferred compensation might be a means of
camouflaging top executive compensation, in which case heavy use might be a
symptom of managerial power. 76 This research does not directly inform the tax
analysis that is the focus of this Article, so I will not summarize it here, but will
direct interested readers to the discussion provided in a recent article by Robert
Jackson and Colleen Honigsberg, 77 and will simply echo Jackson and Honigsberg’s
point that these two stories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they mutually
(2003).
73 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT
AND ECON. 3, 6 (2002).
74 Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L. & ECON.
45, 50 (2007), estimate that qualified plan participant investments in own-company stock
can be worth less than fifty cents on the dollar, depending on the investment horizon,
fraction of assets invested in own-company stock, and volatility. To some degree,
nonqualified deferred compensation balances notionally invested in company stock might
satisfy executive share-holding requirements, in which case notional investment of
nonqualified deferred compensation balances in own-company stock might not worsen an
executive’s aggregate diversification position.
75 This explanation for nonqualified deferred compensation would be consistent with an
“optimal contracting” view of executive pay. In brief, the optimal contracting view posits
that executive pay arrangements are selected to minimize managerial agency costs and
maximize shareholder value. See David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive
Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE
LAW 232, 234 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); John E. Core et al., Executive
Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 ECON. POLICY REVIEW 27, 27-28 (2003).
76 The managerial power view posits that executive pay arrangements reflect agency costs,
as well as combat them, and that compensation design is not consistent with shareholder
value maximization. Under this view, the threat or reality of investor and financial press
outrage plays an important role in disciplining compensation, and, as a result, executives
and directors seek out low salience channels of pay and other means of camouflaging
compensation to minimize outrage. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751, 789 (2002).
77 Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 39, at 483-85.
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II. Approach and Methodology

Ideally, tax (and accounting 78) rules would be neutral with respect to
alternative compensation choices. Neutral rules avoid potentially inefficient
distortions in pay practices as well as adverse distributional impacts. 79 In the
nonqualified deferred compensation realm, the ideal set of tax rules would ensure
neutrality as between current and deferred compensation irrespective of notional
investments made by executives, the uses to which firms put deferred amounts, and
the tax rates faced by both parties. Commentators have proposed two means of
achieving that neutrality: applying current or accrual taxation to nonqualified
deferred compensation contributions and earnings 80 and imposing a special,
neutralizing tax on the investment income arising from nonqualified deferred
compensation. 81

Under an accrual-based scheme, nonqualified deferred compensation
participants, or plan sponsors, would remit taxes based on contributions and annual
gains or losses. 82 This scheme would impose compliance costs on sponsors and/or
participants and would require estimations and “truing-up” with respect to defined
benefit plans, but accrual taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation appears
to be administratively feasible. 83 However, accrual taxation raises the specter of
liquidity concerns inhibiting the use of nonqualified deferred compensation. 84
Commentators have argued that these concerns are overblown, 85 and that is likely
true, but applying accrual taxation to nonqualified deferred compensation, as a
general matter, may be politically unacceptable, nonetheless. 86
Under Halperin’s proposal, employers would remit a special tax assessed (at
the top individual marginal rate) on nonqualified deferred compensation

David I. Walker, Reconsidering Realization-Based Accounting for Equity Compensation 5-6.
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 16-03, Jan. 14, 2016), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715624 (arguing for mark-to-market accounting for long-term
equity pay in order to level the accounting playing field between competing instruments).
79 Halperin, supra note 12, at 539 (1986) (arguing that the NQDC joint tax advantage could
create an unwarranted subsidy for high income taxpayers).
80 See Doran, supra note 12, at 2.
81 Halperin, supra note 12, at 14-15; Yale & Polsky, supra note 12, at 574; Halperin & Yale,
supra note 12, at 943.
82 Doran, supra note 12, at 5, 15.
83 Doran, supra note 12, at 15-16.
84 Halperin & Yale, supra note 12, at 940.
85 Doran, supra note 12, at 16; Halperin, supra note 12, at 541; Halperin & Yale, supra note
12, at 940; Yale & Polsky at 632-33.
86 Halperin & Yale, supra note 12, at 940; Yale & Polsky at 633.
78
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investment returns, while leaving the other tax rules applicable to nonqualified
deferred compensation in place. 87 This approach allays liquidity concerns, and, in
concept, yields an overall result that is economically equivalent to accrual
taxation. 88 However, as Yale and Polsky argue, there would be tradeoffs between
the accuracy and administrability of a special tax regime. 89 This is not to suggest
that the obstacles to accrual taxation or the imposition of a special tax are
insurmountable, only that leveling the tax playing field in this area may not be as
simple or as feasible as one might hope. 90

At the same time, one can question whether a lack of tax neutrality in this
realm presents a serious problem in terms of compensation distortion, high-income
taxpayer subsidy, or adverse impact on the public fisc. To be sure, employers facing
low effective marginal tax rates and their executives can generate significant joint
tax advantages on deferred compensation. But at current tax rates, deferred
compensation plans sponsored by firms with positive tax liabilities can generate
joint tax consequences ranging from disadvantage to advantage, depending on
notional investments by participants and uses of deferred amounts by employers.
Including the 3.8% net investment income surtax 91 and an estimated 1.2% point
effective marginal rate impact of the itemized deduction phase out, 92 top individual
marginal federal tax rates total 25% on long-term capital gains and dividends, and
44.6% on interest and short-term capital gains. The top corporate rate of 35%
applies to capital gain (except for gains on own-company stock), interest, and
business profits. 93 Most dividends on shares of other companies are effectively
taxed to corporate recipients at a 10.5% rate once the dividend-received deduction
is factored in. And firms pay no tax on gains on their own stock per § 1032. 94

Halperin, supra note 12, at 544-50.
Halperin, supra note 12, at 544-50.
89 Yale and Polsky, supra note 12, at 574, passim (analyzing the implications of, inter alia,
choices with respect to the party remitting the special tax and the timing of remittance).
90 Polsky, supra note 40, at 640 (noting that “neutralization would be somewhat complex”);
Halperin & Yale, supra note 12, at 939.
91 I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1) (2012).
92 Alan D. Viard, The Basic Economics of Pease and PEP, 146 TAX NOTES 805, 808 (Feb. 9,
2015) (reporting Tax Policy Center estimate of the impact of the itemized deduction phase
out for taxpayers with cash income in excess of $1 million for 2013).
93 The effective marginal rate faced by businesses eligible for the § 199 Production Activities
Deduction is reduced by 3.15 percentage points. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL41988, THE SECTION 199 PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES DEDUCTION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS (Feb.
27, 2012).
94 The joint tax analysis is also impacted by differences in state and local income tax rates
applicable to investments made by individual and corporate taxpayers. Because these rates
vary widely, I follow previous commentators in ignoring sub-Federal taxes in my joint tax
analysis.
It seems likely that there will be changes in both corporate and individual rates under the
Trump administration, but the impact on the joint tax consequences of nonqualified
deferred compensation is unclear. The Trump campaign proposed a maximum rate of 20%
87
88
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Firms and executives may be operating nonqualified deferred compensation
plans in such a way as to generate joint tax advantages, or they may not. Various
frictions may prevent firms and executives from doing so. As we have seen,
accounting rules may conflict with tax-optimizing behavior, and participants
seeking to optimize their investment portfolios may desire to notionally invest
nonqualified DC amounts in ways that are not conducive to minimizing the joint tax
bill. There are, in short, tensions between the various objectives of participants,
plan sponsors, and shareholders.

How these tensions are resolved is an empirical question. But given the
difficulties (political or otherwise) of achieving tax neutrality, it is worth
investigating how nonqualified deferred compensation plans are operated in
practice to determine whether or to what extent frictions or other considerations
deter firms and executives from minimizing taxes associated with nonqualified
deferred compensation. Is achieving tax neutrality worth it? 95

Currently, firms are not required to disclose the notional nonqualified
defined contribution investments of senior executives or other plan participants; 96
nor are they required to disclose how deferred amounts arising from DB or DC
programs are used. These decisions are almost totally opaque. Firms are required
to disclose annual returns on nonqualified DC balances for their “top 5” executives,
and in recent work, Jackson and Honigsberg utilized this data to reach inferences
regarding executive notional investment. 97
The strategy employed in this paper is different. I interviewed ten
individuals at eight firms with extensive experience in the nonqualified deferred

on capital gains and dividends received by individuals and a maximum corporate rate of
15%. Jim Nunns et al., An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Tax Plan, URBAN INSTITUTE & BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
TAX
POLICY
CENTER
(Dec.
22,
2015),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-donald-trumps-tax-plan/full.
In
2016, House Republicans proposed a maximum corporate rate of 20% and a top rate of
16.5% on individual receipt of interest, dividends, and capital gains. Kyle Pomerleau,
Details and Analysis of the 2016 House Republican Tax Reform Plan, TAX FOUNDATION (July 5,
2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-2016-house-republican-taxreform-plan.
95 Yale and Polsky, supra note 12, at 589 (2007) ask whether revising nonqualified deferred
compensation taxation is worth it, but they focus on the possibility of firms shifting to other
tax-advantaged compensation instruments, such as equity pay, if the nonqualified deferred
compensation opportunity is eliminated. This is a valid question, but I am asking whether
nonqualified deferred compensation tax reform is “worth it” from a different perspective.
Given frictions and other considerations, does the current regime result in substantial
adverse consequences?
96 Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 39, at 507-08, propose mandatory disclosure of senior
executive notional nonqualified deferred compensation investments.
97 See infra note 121.
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compensation “space.” These individuals include consultants that advise companies
with respect to the adoption and design of nonqualified deferred compensation
plans, and individuals employed by firms engaged in administering nonqualified
deferred compensation plans. 98 These individuals have access to information that is
not publicly available. I also consulted surveys conducted by nonqualified deferred
compensation administrators, Newport Group and MullinTBG, and other public
sources. However, as discussed below, I was cautioned that survey responses are
not random and that while the survey information is quite helpful, some of the data
is likely to be affected by a response bias.

The interviews were open-ended telephonic discussions that focused on
factual, often numeric questions, such as “what fraction of your clients informally
fund nonqualified deferred compensation obligations,” although sources very
generously took the time to explain motivations, e.g., why accounting rules
encourage funding in certain situations. While there was some variation in views
among these sources, perhaps reflecting differences in client bases or experience,
these individuals painted a reasonably consistent picture of nonqualified deferred
compensation programs as they currently operate in practice. 99
The interview and survey evidence was supplemented with hand-collected
data gleaned from the proxy statements and nonqualified defined contribution
deferred compensation plan documents of a small sample of S&P 500 companies.
These documents shed considerable light on the range of what is permissible within
nonqualified deferred compensation plans, but only limited light on actual
practices. 100

Interviewees included individuals employed by the large, well-known executive benefit
consultancies including Ernst & Young, Mercer, and Willis Towers Watson; and by smaller
consulting and/or plan administration firms Lockton, MullinTBG, Newport Group and
October Three. Some sources had experience in both plan administration and plan design.
Some sources preferred that their names and company affiliations not be disclosed and are
referenced accordingly.
Interviewees were identified in several ways. Some individuals were listed as contacts on
whitepapers or client memos issued by their firms that addressed various nonqualified
deferred compensation topics. Others were identified through referrals within the various
organizations.
99 While the interview evidence must be classified as anecdotal, I gained confidence in the
information I received as a result of internal coherence, consistency with survey evidence
and proxy statement disclosures (when available), and consistency with theory.
100 I began with a random sample of 50 S&P 500 companies. Proxy statement disclosures
indicate the 40 of these companies have an active nonqualified DC deferred compensation
program. Of course, proxy statement disclosures pertain only to the most senior “named
executive officers” (NEOs) of a company. It is possible that some of these firms operate
nonqualified programs that are not open to their NEOs, but this seems unlikely. Data
reported on usage of the identified nonqualified programs is necessarily limited to usage by
the NEOs.
98

20

Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
III. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation in Practice
This Part describes evidence from surveys, interviews, and company filings
that bears on notional investments by nonqualified DC plan participants and plan
sponsor use of funds freed up as a result of the decision to defer compensation.
Both are critical factors in determining the joint tax consequences of nonqualified
plans as they operate in practice, as detailed in the final section of this Part.

A. Participation and Source of Funds

While plan details vary, most nonqualified DC plans involve elective deferrals
by participants of a fraction of salary, annual bonus, and sometimes other
compensation. 101 But employer contributions to nonqualified DC plans are
common, as well. Fifty percent of firms responding to the Newport Group survey
that maintain nonqualified DC plans reported that they make company
contributions to these plans. 102 Sources generally agreed, however, that participant
elective deferrals make up well over 50% of total nonqualified DC plan
contributions. 103 Of course, the nominal source of funds does not establish which
party bears the burden, but the nominal source of funds may be important when it
comes to the notional investment of these funds. Some plans place vesting or
investment allocation restrictions on “company” funds that do not apply to
“participant” contributions.
E.g., Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 23 (indicating that 93% of responding
companies allow participants to defer some or all of their base salary and annual bonus and
that most of these firms allowed participants to defer 75% or more of these sources of
income). Six percent of the firms responding to the Newport Group’s survey indicated that
participants are permitted to defer restricted stock and restricted stock units. Id.
102 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 15.
An executive who makes elective
nonqualified DC plan deferrals will often face a reduction in company matching funds under
her firm’s qualified 401(k) plan. “Make-up” contributions to the executive’s nonqualified DC
plan make the executive whole with respect to the reduction. This is the most common
company approach, but some firms make discretionary contributions to nonqualified DC
plans, and some firms match participant contributions as if the 401(k) plan had no ceiling
on contributions. Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 15.
103 Telephone Interview with Douglas B. Frederick, Partner, and Kevin L. Mitchell, Principal,
Mercer [hereinafter Frederick & Mitchell Interview] (Feb. 29, 2016); Telephone Interview
with Michael D. Shannon, Vice President, Non-Qualified Consulting, Newport Group
[hereinafter Shannon Interview] (Feb. 23, 2016) (estimating that, depending on economic
conditions, 80% of the contributions in nonqualified DC plans come from participants);
Telephone Interview with Senior Vice President of Executive Benefits Consulting and
Design Firm [hereinafter Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits Consulting and
Design Firm] (Feb. 19, 2016) (estimating that 90% of contributions are from participants);
Telephone Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra
note 39. For my sample of S&P 500 firms, 73% of the contributions in the most recent year
consisted of employee dollars.
101
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Nonqualified DC plans are generally open to executives and employees
beyond the senior executive suite. Eligibility is generally determined by position
(most commonly senior vice presidents or above) or by compensation level (most
commonly in the $115,000-$150,000 range or above). 104 Respondents to the
Newport Group survey reported that about 46% of eligible individuals elected to
defer compensation in 2013. 105

Nonqualified DB plans are commonly structured as supplemental executive
retirement plans. Participation is defined by contract, and the plan sponsor
generally makes all contributions.

B. Participant Notional Investment

DB plans are typically designed to replace a fraction of participants’ preretirement income. 106 The plan sponsor is responsible for ensuring that funds will
be available to provide benefits, and participants are not involved in these decisions.
There is no notional investment in own-company stock, or any other notional
investment for that matter, in these DB plans.

DC plans generally shift the investment responsibility, at lease notionally, to
participants. Companies are still responsible for ensuring that funds are available to
provide benefits (recall that the benefit reflects an unsecured promise to pay), but
the level of promised benefits is determined by participant notional investment
choices, not by a pre-determined formula.

Typically, participants are offered a range of notional investment options
that is the same as or similar to the range of investments offered in a firm’s 401(k)
program. Two-thirds of the firms responding to the Newport Group survey that
offered mutual fund investments reported that their plans included ten to nineteen
investment options. 107 One source suggested that the idea is to cover all of the
major investment categories, while minimizing duplication. 108

Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 18-19.
Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 21.
106 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 42.
107 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 24. Forty percent of a sample of S&P 500 firms
that offer nonqualified DC plans disclosed in proxy materials or plan documents that the
notional investment options were the same as or similar to their 401(k) investment options,
but about half of firms failed to make any disclosures on this issue.
An obscure, but possibly important reason for mirroring 401(k) investment menus
is qualification of nonqualified DC benefits as “retirement income” under a federal statute
that bars states from taxing retirement income received by out-of-state residents. 4 U.S.C. §
114 (1996). For example, suppose that an executive works in New York (a high tax state)
and subsequently retires to Florida (a no tax state). Under regular tax principles, New York
would have grounds for taxing retirement income earned in New York although received in
Florida. 4 U.S.C. § 114 bars such out-of-state taxation, but only to the extent of “retirement
income,” a defined term. Retirement income includes nonqualified DC benefits that are
104
105
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Survey and interview responses indicate that a minority of firms allow
participants to notionally invest in own-company stock. Only 21% of the firms
responding to the Newport Group’s survey reported that company stock was a
permissible investment option. 109 Interview sources confirmed that most firms do
not include own-company stock as a notional investment option. 110

Sources agreed that a primary reason many companies exclude owncompany stock from their notional investment menus is the difficulty of managing
income statement volatility associated with this investment choice. 111 But other

received in the form of a ten-year or longer annuity, but lump sum payments are considered
retirement income only if the DC program exists “solely” to supplement a tax-limited
qualified plan. Although the law on this point has not been clarified, firms may think it
prudent to mimic 401(k) terms as closely as possible in order to qualify lump sum
nonqualified deferred compensation payouts as retirement income that is insulated from
out-of-state taxation.
108 Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39.
Sources noted that some plans limit investment choices with respect to unvested employer
contributions, e.g., to fixed income investments only. Telephone Interview with Eric
Kaufman, Senior Vice President, Lockton Companies (Feb. 16, 2016); Shannon Interview,
supra note 103.
While one might expect highly compensated corporate executives to gravitate towards
hedge funds and other aggressive investment alternatives, I have no evidence of these
alternatives being offered through nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements.
109 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 26. Only 6.5% of firms responding to a survey
conducted by nonqualified deferred compensation plan administrator MullinTBG reported
company stock as an investment option, but this fraction seems too low to be plausible. I do
not have the survey questionnaire, but perhaps there was confusion between offering
company stock as one option or as the sole vehicle. MULLINTBG, 2014 EXECUTIVE BENEFIT
SURVEY, SUMMARY OF RESULTS 7 (2015) [hereinafter MullinTBG Survey].
110 Telephone Interview with Peter Neuwirth, Senior Consultant, Willis Towers Watson
[hereinafter Neuwirth Interview] (Feb. 19, 2016); Interview with Executive Benefits
Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39; Shannon Interview, supra note 103;
Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits Consulting and Design Firm, supra note 103.
See also Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives,
24 REV. FIN. STUDIES 3813, 3823 (2011) (finding that 38% of a sample of large companies in
which CEOs had positive nonqualified deferred compensation balances prohibited notional
investment in own-company stock); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 53 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 11-49, 2012) (reviewing proxy statements for 83 banking companies and finding that
28 allowed senior executives to notionally invest in own-company stock, that 27 did not
provide this option, and that another 27 did not offer nonqualified deferred compensation
or had CEOs with a zero balance). Eleven of the forty S&P 500 companies I analyzed allow
participants to direct their contributions into company stock; eight did not allow this; the
rest were silent on this issue.
111 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 26; Interview with Executive Benefits
Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39; Shannon Interview, supra note 103;
Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits Consulting and Design Firm, supra note 103.
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reasons were offered as well. 112 Notional nonqualified deferred compensation
investment in own-company stock held by directors and officers is treated like other
company shares held by these individuals for purposes of proxy disclosure;
Securities Exchange Act (SEA) § 16 reporting requirements and short-swing trading
restraints under SEA § 16(b); and Sarbanes-Oxley limitations, including trading
restrictions during qualified plan blackout periods. 113

Some companies, however, allow or even encourage notional DC investment
in own-company stock. Six percent of the companies responding to the Newport
Group’s survey indicated that participants are permitted to defer restricted stock or
restricted stock units. Typically, these deferrals would be in and remain in the form
of shares, avoiding the accounting problems associated with diversifiable or cash
settled balances tied to own-company stock. 114 More generally, one source
indicated that about 10% of his clients require nonqualified DC investment to be in
own-company stock. 115

In my sample of S&P 500 nonqualified DC programs, no companies limited
participant contributions to own company stock, but three companies tied employer
contributions to their stock prices, 116 and two companies provided significant
incentives for participants to notionally invest in own-company stock. Leggett &
Platt provides a 20% bonus for deferred amounts notionally invested in company
stock. 117 Aetna offers only two choices for investment – a company stock fund and a
fixed income fund. 118 But such cases seem rare. Much more common are

In addition to the obstacles that follow, MullinTBG notes that in some states owncompany shares held in a rabbi trust count towards dilution in addition to the notional
own-company shares held in participant DC portfolios, doubling the dilutive impact of
hedging own-company stock in kind. MULLINTBG, AN OVERVIEW TO DEFERRAL PLAN NOTIONAL
STOCK ACCOUNTING (2014).
113 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2012); COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK, supra
note 69; Andrew C. Liazos, Sarbanes-Oxley Act - Implications for Executive Compensation,
MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMORY (Sep. 9, 2002); Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103;
Shannon Interview, supra note 103; Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits
Consulting and Design Firm, supra note 103.
114 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 23; Shannon interview, supra note 103. Thirty
percent of the S&P 500 companies I analyzed permitted RS/RSU deferrals, although senior
executives took advantage of this opportunity at only 3 or 4 of the 40 firms.
115 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
116 These companies are The Home Depot, J.M. Smucker, and PPG Industries. THE HOME
DEPOT, PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF 2016 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 38 (Mar. 24,
2016); THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF 2015 ANNUAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS 48-49 (Jul. 1, 2015); PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN 14 (as
amended and restated effective Jan. 1, 2011) (Exhibit 10.11 to Form 10-K filed Feb. 18,
2016).
117 LEGGETT & PLATT, INC., PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF 2016 ANNUAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS 26 (Mar. 30, 2016).
118 AETNA, INC., PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF AETNA,
INC. 49 (April 8, 2016).
112
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nonqualified DC plans that mirror 401(k)s and provide no apparent incentive for
investment in own-company stock.

So how do nonqualified DC participants actually (notionally) invest? Surveys
and proxy statement disclosures do not reach this question, but interview sources
agreed on the general picture. Consistent with their diversification needs,
participants generally do not voluntarily invest deferred cash compensation in owncompany stock. Some sources simply noted that they generally do not see
executives investing in their own companies’ stock. 119 Another indicated that
participants do so only when required to do so. 120

Most sources declined to estimate the fraction of nonqualified DC funds
notionally invested in own-company stock, preferring to focus on the limited
opportunity to do so, but one source suggested that less than 20% of fund balances
were notionally invested in own-company stock among their clients, in aggregate. 121

Telephone Interview with John Lowell, Consultant, October Three [hereinafter Lowell
Interview] (Feb. 16, 2016); Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an
International Firm, supra note 39.
120 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
121 Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103.
While consistent with diversification pressures and limited access to investment in
own-company stock, the relatively modest notional investment in own-company stock by
nonqualified DC plan participants described by sources appears to run counter to findings
in recent work by Jackson and Honigsberg. See Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 39, at 496.
Jackson and Honigsberg were interested in whether executive retirement account balances
were notionally invested so as to align executive incentives with debtholders, as some had
theorized. Jackson and Honigsberg argued that to the extent that retirement balances were
notionally invested in own-company stock, they tended to align executives with
shareholders, rather than with debtholders. Because notional retirement plan investments
are not disclosed, Jackson and Honigsberg looked for a correlation between defined
contribution plan returns, which are disclosed for “top 5” executives, and company stock
returns. Jackson and Honigsberg noted that this approach has limitations, but they found
evidence suggesting that “the value of a large proportion of executive retirement pay is
linked to company stock prices,” and that “the retirement benefits of more than one out of
three executives are invested entirely in [their] company’s stock.” Jackson & Honigsberg,
supra note 39, at 481. Although I cannot readily identify the source of the discrepancy, one
factor that might contribute is that proxy statement disclosures of nonqualified deferred
compensation include vested, but undelivered restricted stock and performance shares,
even if these shares are deferred for only two or three years. In my sample of S&P 500
companies, short-term deferrals at two banks – Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley –
accounted for almost 70% of aggregate contributions to nonqualified deferred
compensation accounts as disclosed in proxy statements.
To be clear, Jackson and Honigsberg were only interested in notional investment of
account balances and the impact on the incentives of the executives holding these balances.
They were not interested in what companies did with the deferred compensation amounts
prior to payout. The latter question, as we will see, is of greater importance in determining
the joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred compensation.
119
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Moving beyond own-company stock, one source suggested that participants
generally select notional investments in an economically rational manner, with a
greater emphasis on equities during early earning years, shifting to more debt as
participants near retirement. 122 Other sources suggested that balances were
typically notionally invested somewhat more conservatively than 401(k)
One source explained that because nonqualified deferred
balances. 123
compensation is an unsecured promise to pay, participants were advised to draw
down these funds before drawing on secured qualified plan funds, leading to a
shorter investment horizon and a more conservative investment strategy. 124
Another source noted that some participants use nonqualified elective deferral
plans as a means of saving for their children’s college education, rather than for
retirement, again suggesting a shorter horizon and a more conservative investment
approach. 125 Again, most sources declined to estimate the typical investment
portfolio, but one source suggested a ballpark estimate for aggregate defined
contribution balances at large firms of 40% debt/10% own-company stock/50%
other equities. 126
C. Informal Funding By Plan Sponsors

Companies sponsoring nonqualified plans face three decisions in the interim
between deferral and payout: 1) to what extent to set aside or informally fund
obligations versus using deferred amounts in the business and operating the plan on
a pay-as-you-go basis, and if funds are set aside, 2) what vehicles to use to manage
these funds, if any, and 3) how to invest those funds.

Extent of Informal Funding. Firms cannot formally fund nonqualified plan
obligations as they would qualified plan obligations without jeopardizing
participant tax deferral. But firms can, and often do, informally set aside funds that
offset nonqualified plan obligations. The first decision is whether to set aside funds
or leave those funds in the business, reduce borrowing, etc. Sources and surveys
provide several rationales for informal funding. First, income statement volatility
arising from plan obligations (company stock excepted) can be managed by setting
aside funds and purchasing identical securities. 127 Second, ratings agencies and

Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39.
Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103.
124 Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103. Johnson & Honigsberg’s study confirms
executives do tend to heed this advice. See Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 39, at 501
(finding that the median executive in their sample receives all retirement pay within three
years of their separation from the company).
125 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
126 Frederick & Mitchell interview, supra note 103.
127 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 50; MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9;
Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110; Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an
International Firm, supra note 39 .
122
123
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analysts may be uncomfortable with large, unfunded plan liabilities on company
balance sheets. 128 Third, informal funding may, in fact, provide added security for
plan participants in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency. One source recounted as
conventional wisdom that while funds set aside in a rabbi trust technically are
available to general creditors, the existence of such a trust tends to result in plan
participants receiving a larger share of assets in bankruptcy or insolvency
proceedings. 129
On the other hand, large companies with relatively small nonqualified plan
obligations may feel little need to set aside funds, while other firms may prefer to
use the deferred compensation amounts in the business. 130

Practitioner Robert Miller, writing in 2002, reported that it was most
common not to informally fund nonqualified plans, 131 but the situation apparently
has changed. Sixty-two percent of the firms responding to the MullinTBG survey
reported that they informally funded nonqualified plan obligations, while 71% of
the Newport Group’s respondents reported funding nonqualified DC obligations and
55% reported funding nonqualified DB obligations. 132 One source cautioned that
these surveys may overstate the prevalence of funding, 133 but interviewee estimates
were not materially different, ranging from 50% to 80-90% of firms informally
funding nonqualified plan obligations to some degree. 134
MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9; Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits
Consulting and Design Firm, supra note 103.
129 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
See also COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK 3
(reporting that “there is anecdotal experience that an informally funded [nonqualified
deferred compensation] arrangement does have some increased likelihood of successfully
navigating the dangers of company insolvency”); M BENEFIT SOLUTIONS, WHITE PAPER: WHY
COMPANIES USE RABBI TRUSTS 4 (“M Benefit Solutions has had several clients go through a
bankruptcy and the existence of a rabbi trust, we believe, helped executives there to obtain
payment of all or a large percentage of their nonqualified deferred compensation benefits.
Whether they would have been able to obtain this result without an asset already set aside
to make the benefit payments is difficult to say, but is less likely.”).
To be sure, some of the sources of this anecdotal evidence have a financial interest in firms
adopting rabbi trusts or other informal funding vehicles, but increased protection against
insolvency risk would run counter to the nonqualified deferred compensation bargain.
130 MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9; Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 52;
Lowell interview, supra note 119; Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an
International Firm, supra note 39.
131 MILLER, supra note 34, at 284.
132 MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9; Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 51.
133 Lowell Interview, supra note 119. The concern is that the firms conducting the surveys
are providers of funding vehicles, such as COLI, and that clients of these firms may respond
at a higher rate than firms without a client relationship.
134 The estimates I received were as follows: 50-65% (Frederick and Mitchell Interview,
supra note 103), 55% (Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110), 65% (Interview with Executive
Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39), 75-90% (Lowell Interview,
128
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Informal funding is not an all or nothing decision. Less than half of the firms
responding to MullinTBG’s survey reported funding 100% of liabilities. 135 One
source indicated that some of his clients fund only the equity portion of the DC
notional investment portfolios of participants. Liabilities tied to debt securities are
less volatile, and some firms see less of a need to hedge these liabilities. 136

Informal Funding Vehicles. Firms that informally fund nonqualified plan
obligations must choose a vehicle or vehicles to do so. The options are essentially
rabbi trusts, corporate owned life insurance policies, and segregated accounts,
although these can be and often are combined.

Rabbi trusts are very common. 137 A rabbi trust is a grantor trust, and
typically these trusts are designed to be irrevocable, providing plan participants
with protection against an employer’s change of heart or a possible change of
control. 138 But, as noted, trust assets are available to general corporate creditors.
Income earned within rabbi trusts is taxed to the employer, and thus holding set
aside funds in a rabbi trust (versus in a non-trust segregated account) has no tax
consequences. 139 Rabbi trusts are frequently used because they are simple and
inexpensive to implement, because they provide a platform for hedging activities,
and because, despite the requirement that trust assets remain available to general
creditors, in practice they may provide some participant security, as explained
above. 140

Formerly, employers sometimes held set aside funds in offshore trust
accounts as a means of increasing participant security. However, I.R.C. § 409A(b)
now provides for current participant taxation with respect to assets set aside in a
foreign trust to informally fund nonqualified deferred compensation obligations,
unless substantially all participant services are performed in the foreign
jurisdiction. Presumably, substantially all rabbi trusts backing U.S. employmentbased nonqualified deferred compensation are located in the U.S.

supra note 119), 80-90% (Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an
International Firm, supra note 39).
135 MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9.
136 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
137 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 54 (88% of DC plans with informal funding and
71% of DB plans with informal funding utilized rabbi trusts in 2013). But note that these
figures may be overestimated because of the likely survey response bias discussed supra
note 133.
138 The term “rabbi trust” reflects the historical accident that the first IRS letter ruling on
these vehicles addressed a trust created by a congregation for the benefit of its rabbi. The
IRS has provided a model rabbi trust document that serves as a safe harbor for these
arrangements and specifies the basic terms. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 CB. 22.
139 Grantor trust tax rules are found in I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (2012).
140 See text accompanying supra notes 66, 129.
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Corporate-owned life insurance is commonly employed as a means of
informally funding and sometimes managing nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements. COLI insures the lives of current and former employees, 141 but the
policies are owned by plan sponsors who pay the premiums and are the
beneficiaries. A COLI policy is a general corporate asset, although a policy may be
held within a rabbi trust, providing limited security to plan participants as discussed
above. Alternatively, employers can use COLI products to manage set-aside assets
and hedge participant notional investments without the necessity of creating a rabbi
trust. 142 Either way, employers typically purchase variable universal life insurance
policies that allow them to select a mix of investments that match participant
notional investment portfolios and to adjust these investments over time. 143
COLI products provide certain tax benefits. Although premiums are not
deductible, 144 tax is deferred on the cash value buildup while a policy is in force,
allowing plan sponsors to rebalance their hedging portfolios without incurring
current tax; and death benefits, including both the pure insurance payout and
investment returns, are received tax free if certain IRS requirements are met. 145 In
the not uncommon case in which a policy is liquidated prior to the death of an

Although the cases are not uniform, employers have been held to have an insurable
interest in the lives of their employees under state law, and that interest extends beyond the
termination of their employment. Social security system data is used to determine when
death benefits are due with respect to former employees. See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES 158 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that some “courts have … upheld COLI programs, at
least when the employee consented to the placement of the life insurance on the employee’s
life and the employer made a colorable claim of financial loss resulting from the death of the
employee”). Moreover, statutes have been enacted in some states explicitly recognizing that
employers may have insurable interests in the lives of employees. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D, § 43:14 (2009) (citing Indiana Code § 27-1-12-17-1 as an example).
142 Interview with Senior VP of Executive Benefits Consulting and Design Firm, supra note
103.
143
Frequently
Asked
Questions
about
Coli,
BOLICOLI.COM,
http://www.bolicoli.com/frequently-asked-questions-about-coli.
144 I.R.C. § 264(a)(1) (2012) disallows deductions for insurance premiums when the
taxpayer is the beneficiary.
145 Nunn, supra note 64, at 201 (citing I.R.C. §§ 101(j), 72(e)(5)(A), (e)(10) (2012));
FARGO
(2013),
available
at
Nonqualified
Plan
Basics,
WELLS
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/commercial/retirement-employeebenefits/perspectives/nonqualified-plan-basics.pdf.
Death benefits are taxable if a
corporate owner fails to comply with IRC § 101(j). See infra note 178. Note also that COLI
use can also result in increased Alternative Minimum Tax obligations. Tax Consequences of
NQDC for the Employer, in TAXATION AND FUNDING OF NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION
41-43 (Marla J. Aspinwall and Michael G. Goldstein, eds., 2d ed. 2012).
141
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insured employee, gains are taxed at that point, resulting in deferral of tax but not
exemption. 146

While Congress has acted several times to limit abusive, leveraged COLI
plans, 147 few steps have been taken to address the fundamental tax advantages
arising from COLI. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 is a notable exception. That
act created I.R.C. § 101(j), which curtails the exclusion of death benefits in the case
of employer-owned life insurance. COLI death benefits are now excluded from
income only if the universe of insured employees is limited to directors and the top
35% of earners and insured employees provide informed written consent. Congress
has not acted, however, to curtail the benefit of deferral of tax on the cash value
build up within these plans. 148

While tax advantaged, COLI products are expensive and complex. 149 Firms
purchasing these policies are paying for insurance, in addition to a tax-preferred
investment vehicle. And one source noted that it can take up to a year to put a COLI
in place. 150 A further potential drawback is that investment options within a COLI
vehicle are generally limited and may not perfectly match the options available to
plan participants. 151 One source suggested as a general matter that COLI use is
prevalent for large plans with large obligations since the tax benefits offset the
146 Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103, noting that many firms using COLI fail to
reap the full tax advantages since they tend to liquidate policies to satisfy plan obligations
before death benefits are paid.
147 Leveraged COLI plans, often covering thousands of employees (and generally having
little or nothing to do with nonqualified deferred compensation), were a popular tax shelter
during the 1980s and 1990s. In a typical arrangement, a plan sponsor would pay premiums
using a combination of death benefits, dividends, and loans from the insurance company
derived from the cash value build up within the plan. Deduction of interest and fees could
turn a pre-tax losing arrangement into a post-tax winner. Leveraged COLIs of this type
were eliminated through a combination of IRS litigation victories, based primarily on antiabuse principles, and a change of law in 1996 that significantly limited the deductibility of
interest on COLI-backed loans. Because money is fungible, it remains possible for firms to
indirectly leverage COLI arrangements. See Jennifer L. Brown, The Spread of Aggressive
Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance
Shelter, 86 ACCT. REV. 23, 23-25 (2011) (describing the leveraged COLI shelter and
legislative and judicial responses); Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax
Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 256-57 (2002) (same); BAIRD WEBEL & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33414, CORPORATE-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (COLI): INSURANCE AND TAX
ISSUES (Jan. 21, 2011) (describing and analyzing evolving COLI tax rules).
148 As discussed more fully in text accompanying infra note 179, legislation has been offered
as recently as 2003 that would, with limited exceptions, require employers to include COLI
cash value build up in income on an annual basis and eliminate exclusion of death benefits.
149 COLI purchase also introduces counterparty risk, which can be significant given the long
time horizons involved. Nunn, supra note 64, at 202.
150 Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103
151 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
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administrative costs and other drawbacks. 152 Another source suggested that COLI
use is actually declining among his clients. 153

Ultimate Investment of Set Aside Funds. From a joint tax perspective, the
important questions here involve the extent of COLI use and the ultimate
investment of set aside funds. The two surveys suggest extensive use of COLI.
Fifty-four percent of firms that informally fund and responded to MullinTBG’s
survey reported using COLI, 42% taxable securities, and 19% cash. 154 Obviously,
some firms combine these. Newport Group’s survey respondents indicated even
more overlapping use of funding mechanisms for DC plans with 73% using COLI to
some extent, 39% taxable mutual funds, 14% bonds, 13% company stock, and 11%
separately managed investment accounts. 155 Sources, however, suggested that
these surveys likely overstate COLI use. Sources estimated that funding was divided
about 50/50 between COLI and taxable securities. 156 Generally, these taxable
securities would be held in a rabbi trust, but, as noted above, the interposition of a
rabbi trust has no impact on joint tax consequences.

Companies appear to only rarely informally fund nonqualified deferred
compensation liabilities with their own stock. Thirteen percent of Newport Group’s
survey respondents reported funding DC obligations to some degree with their own
stock, while none reported funding DB liabilities in this fashion. 157 One source
estimated that less than 10% of funds set aside are in company stock. 158 He
explained that when participant notional investment is in company stock and will be
paid in stock, firms often set aside shares to fund the obligation, but when notional
stock investment will be paid in cash, firms generally do not set aside shares
because doing so does not offset the income statement volatility. 159 Thus, it is not
surprising that if participant notional investment in stock is modest to begin with,
informal funding in company stock is even more modest. 160

Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103.
154 MullinTBG Survey, supra note 109, at 9.
155 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 53.
156 Frederick & Mitchell Interview, supra note 103; Interview with Executive Benefits
Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39.
157 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 53. Company stock was not listed as an
informal funding vehicle used by MullinTBG Survey responders, but it is not clear whether
this should be interpreted as zero use of company stock, a failure to list company stock as
an option on the survey, or something else. It is unlikely, however, that funding with owncompany stock is prevalent for MullinTBG Survey responders, given the silence.
158 Shannon Interview, supra note 103.
159 Shannon Interview, supra note 103. Alternatively, plan sponsors may hedge cash-settled
notional own-company stock investments with mutual funds that approximate the
performance of the shares. COMPLEMENTING RESTRICTED STOCK, supra note 69.
160 It is interesting to compare the use of own-company stock to fund nonqualified plan
obligations to its use in funding qualified plan obligations. While ERISA rules cap owncompany stock holdings at 10% of qualified DB plan assets, until recently own-company
152
153
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With the exception of own-company stock, it is reasonable to assume that
funds set aside by nonqualified DC plan sponsors are ultimately invested in such a
way as to mirror as closely as possible the notional investment portfolios of
participants. This follows from plan sponsors’ emphasis on managing the income
statement volatility arising from the liabilities, and should generally be true whether
the funding vehicle is a COLI or a taxable account.
It is less obvious how amounts set aside to fund DB liabilities would
ultimately be invested. The Newport Group survey suggests that firms commonly
use COLI to fund these obligations, and that among taxable investments, mutual
funds are employed about twice as often as bonds. 161 Of course, the fact that twice
as many sponsors utilize taxable mutual funds as bonds does not tell us that the
ratio of dollars is two to one, but it does suggest a mix of debt and equity is held
outside of COLI accounts.

Non-Set Aside Funds. What happens to deferred dollars that are not set aside
to meet plan liabilities? These funds are used in the business, often substituting for
borrowing. One source noted that in deciding whether or to what extent to fund, his
clients typically look at one of three benchmarks for returns on non-set aside funds
– their borrowing costs, return on cash investments, or internal rate of return. 162
The appropriate benchmark would depend on a firm’s particular circumstances.
D. Joint Tax Consequences of Nonqualified Plans in Practice

The joint tax consequences of nonqualified plans in practice are a function of
employer actual use of deferred amounts as compared with counterfactual
participant investment outside the plan. In the analysis that follows, I use notional
participant investments in DC plans as a proxy for these hypothetical outside
investments. In cases in which sponsors informally fund DC plan obligations, I
generally assume that the instruments are the same, e.g., equity hedging equity or
debt hedging debt.

The one exception to this is that not all notional investment in own-company
stock is hedged with company stock given the fact that gains or losses on stock held
to hedge notional stock investments do not flow through to income statements. The
§ 1032 tax advantage is limited to the extent of sponsor hedging with own-company
stock. Suppose, for example, that IBM employees notionally invest nonqualified DC
accounts in IBM stock and that IBM purchases S&P 500 index funds as a hedge,
placing these index funds in a taxable account. Participants will receive cash
benefits based on IBM’s return, but IBM will pay tax at its regular rates on index

stock accounted for half of qualified DC plan assets for almost 20% of participants in the
largest plans. See infra Part IV(E).
161 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 53.
162 Neuwirth Interview, supra note 110.
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fund gains and losses and dividends. The joint tax advantage or disadvantage in this
case would be determined by comparing IBM’s tax rate on the index fund
investment with participants’ counterfactual tax rate on outside investments in IBM
stock (or other equities, which is largely the same).
In cases in which sponsors do not informally fund nonqualified plan
obligations, taxation of business returns is compared with counterfactual
participant investment in debt or equity securities, as suggested by DC notional
investments.

In the analysis that follows, I assume that corporations and individuals
generally are taxed at the highest U.S. marginal rates, 163 and I add the net
investment income surtax to individual rates. I assume that COLI returns are taxed
at a zero rate, despite the suggestion of one source that COLI policies are often
liquidated prematurely. 164 I ignore the possibility that individuals use life insurance
products to reduce taxes on outside investments. 165 While comparing COLI funded
deferred compensation with fully taxable outside investment might be considered
an apples to oranges comparison, it is the assumption that maximizes the joint tax
advantage I am attempting to identify and helps us appreciate the worst-case
scenario from the perspective of the public fisc. Moreover, there is no particular
reason to match COLI funded deferred compensation with insurance-based outside
investment. Any individual willing to absorb the cost can reduce taxes on his or her
savings by investing through life insurance products.

Given the effective prohibition under I.R.C. § 409A on offshore rabbi trusts, it seems
reasonable to analyze non-COLI-based employer investments using U.S. corporate income
tax rates. Of course, the effective marginal tax rate on U.S. income may be less than the top
marginal rates as a result of NOLs. See infra Part IV.A.3.
164 As discussed in text accompanying supra notes 91-94, the marginal rates assumed are as
follows:
Individual: long-term capital gains and dividends, 25%; interest and short-term capital
gains, 44.6%.
Corporate: own stock gains and COLI returns, 0; dividends, 10.5%; capital gain, interest, and
business profits, 35%.
These rates are likely to change under the Trump administration, but at this point the
impact of the joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred compensation are unclear.
COLI policies that are liquidated prematurely would still provide the benefit of tax deferral,
but not exemption. The tax benefit, however, would be offset by the unrecovered cost of the
insurance.
As noted supra note 94, I follow previous commentators in ignoring the impact of state local
income taxes on the joint tax analysis.
165 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH J. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
159-61 (7th ed. 2013) (describing the preferential tax treatment (and limitations)
associated with life insurance contracts).
163
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To place the following analysis in perspective, note that DC commitments
probably represent about half of total nonqualified deferred compensation
obligations currently, 166 but that the DC fraction is increasing over time.
1. Defined Contribution Plans

As an initial matter, let us assume that about 50% of deferred DC sums are
set aside by plan sponsors to meet future obligations. 167 Sources suggest that no
more than 10% of dollars set aside by plan sponsors (perhaps 5% of total DC
commitments) are invested in own-company stock to hedge stock-based obligations
to participants. The joint tax advantage is large. A plan sponsor pays no tax on
gains on its own stock; the participant would have paid tax at individual rates
topping out at 25%. But the § 1032 advantage is currently being enjoyed on only
about 5% (and unlikely to be more than 10%) of total DC balances.
Employer
Own stock: t = 0

Participant
Own stock: t = 25%

Joint Tax Advantage
25%

Employer
COLI: t = 0
COLI: t = 0

Participant
Equity: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
25%
44.6%

Sources suggest a roughly even split between the use of COLI and taxable
securities in funding plan obligations. 168 If so, roughly a quarter of total
commitments would be funded with COLI. These COLI dollars are used primarily to
hedge the income statement volatility of participant notional investments, so in
aggregate COLI contain a mix of debt and equity mirroring participant investment.
It appears, however, that firms are somewhat less likely to fund the debt side of
participant portfolios. If so, COLI likely hold somewhat more equity than a 40/60
overall debt/equity notional investment estimate would suggest. In any event, use
of a COLI does generate a joint tax advantage. That advantage is greater if the
counterfactual investment would be individual investment in debt securities (or
short term capital gains), but it is significant, nonetheless.

The use of taxable securities to fund nonqualified DC commitments results in
mixed joint tax consequences. Long-term capital gains are taxed at a higher rate to
corporations than to individuals (35% versus 25%), while interest, dividends, and
short-term capital gains are taxed at a lower rate (interest and short-term capital

Jackson & Honigsberg found that DC balances accounted for 44% of total nonqualified
deferred compensation for senior executives in 2011. Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 39,
at 491-92.
167 Sources suggest that over 50% of plan sponsors set aside funds to manage DC obligations
but firms frequently fund less than 100% of those obligations, so 50% of dollars set aside
seems a reasonable assumption.
168 Supra text accompanying notes 154-156.
166
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gains: 35% versus 44.6%; dividends: 10.5% versus 25%). Sources suggest that
firms are more likely to set aside funds to hedge the equity-side of notional
portfolios, but returns to equity in the form of long-term capital gains are tax
disadvantaged, while short-term capital gain and dividend returns are tax
advantaged. In aggregate, dividends have accounted for over almost half of S&P 500
company returns over the long haul and a somewhat lesser percentage of U.S. equity
returns overall. 169 Nonetheless, without further data, it would appear that the joint
tax consequences of notional equity investment hedged with taxable securities are
roughly neutral. 170
Employer
Taxable LTCG: t = 35%
Taxable divs: t = 10.5%
Taxable debt: t = 35%

Participant
LTCG: t = 25%
Divs: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
(10%)
14.5%
9.6%

Finally, we have the roughly 50% of deferred DC dollars that are left in the
business. These dollars are associated with notional debt and equity investments of
participants that may be somewhat more debt-heavy than our overall 40%
debt/60% equity benchmark, because firms are somewhat more likely to leave debt
obligations un-hedged.

Assuming that the appropriate tax rate on business profits is 35% (and that
business returns roughly mirror market returns), the parties face a joint tax
disadvantage on equity held in participant portfolios (both long-term gains and
dividends: 35% corporate versus 25% individual) and a joint tax advantage on debt
returns (35% corporate versus 44.6% individual).
Employer
Business: t = 35%
Business: t = 35%

Participant
Equity: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
(10%)
9.6%

These joint tax consequences are summarized in the graphic that follows.
Joint tax advantage is good from the point of view of the private parties, hence
green, and joint tax disadvantage is bad, hence red. Neutral is yellow. More intense
colors represent larger joint tax advantage or disadvantage. For simplicity, I have
assumed a 60/40 equity/debt split and that equity returns are an equal mix of
Adam Johnson, Show Me the Money: Why Dividends Matter, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2014,
11:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-10/show-me-the-moneywhy-dividends-matter (calculating that dividends accounted for 46% of the total return on
the S&P 500 between 1989 and 2014).
170 It is in the context of sponsor funding with taxable securities (and the context of
unfunded liabilities which follows) that any change in marginal rates adopted during the
Trump administration will be most consequential for the joint tax analysis of nonqualified
deferred compensation.
169
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dividends and long-term capital gains. Obviously, this chart reflects only a rough
approximation of joint tax consequences in practice.

2. Defined Benefit Plans
Although DB plans are declining in importance, many Fortune 500 executives
are grandfathered into DB plans, and DB plans will likely continue to be important
in certain industries, such as utilities. There are no notional participant investments
and there is little income statement volatility associated with these plans, and, as a
result, they are less likely to be funded. It seems likely that well under 50% of DB
obligations are funded.
Companies do not report using their own shares as a funding mechanism for
DB plans, so § 1032 plays little or no role here. However, firms often do use COLI
products to fund DB liabilities. Half or even three-quarters of dollars funding DB
liabilities may be invested through COLI, likely generating a joint tax benefit.

Employer
COLI: t = 0
COLI: t = 0

Participant
Equity: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
25%
44.6%

The remaining set-aside funds are invested in a taxable fashion, which may
or may not result in a joint tax benefit. Interest and dividends are taxed at a lower
rate to companies than individuals; long-term capital gains are taxed at a higher
rate.
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Employer
Taxable LTCG: t = 35%
Taxable divs: t = 10.5%
Taxable debt: t = 35%

Participant
LTCG: t = 25%
Divs: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
(10%)
14.5%
9.6%

Employer
Business: t = 35%
Business: t = 35%

Participant
Equity: t = 25%
Debt: t = 44.6%

Joint Tax Advantage
(10%)
9.6%

As in the case of DC plans, firm use of deferred DB dollars in their business
operations may result in a joint tax advantage or disadvantage, depending on the
counterfactual outside investment by participants. The corporate tax rate
applicable to business earnings is greater than the individual rate on long-term
capital gains and dividends (joint tax disadvantage) but lower than the individual
rate on interest and short-term capital gains (joint tax advantage).

These joint tax consequences of nonqualified DB plans in practice are
portrayed in the graphic that follows. As before, I have assumed a 60/40
equity/debt split and that equity returns are long-term capital gains. Again, this
chart reflects only a rough approximation of joint tax consequences in practice.
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IV. Discussion
A. Is There a Joint Tax Advantage Issue to Worry About, and, If So, What Is It?
It is not clear that the joint tax advantage enjoyed by nonqualified deferred
compensation participants and sponsors justifies reform of the basic tax rules. On
the other hand, it may be worth considering reform targeted at COLI use.
1. I.R.C. § 1032

Section 1032 is less relevant to nonqualified deferred compensation practice
than one might surmise. 171 Diversification concerns deter participants from tying
deferred compensation returns to own-company stock and accounting concerns
tend to deter sponsors. As discussed below, apparently no more own-company
stock is set aside to informally fund nonqualified deferred compensation liabilities
than has historically been contributed to qualified plan trusts, despite the fact that
§ 1032 provides a tax advantage only with respect to nonqualified plan
contributions. 172

To be sure, some firms may hold treasury shares that are not specifically
allocated to informally funding nonqualified deferred compensation liabilities, and
these firms may have deferred compensation liabilities that exceed amounts set
aside in rabbi trusts or COLI accounts. Should we assume a zero employer rate of
tax on nonqualified deferred compensation to the extent that a firm holds treasury
shares and has unfunded liabilities? In my view we should not. If treasury shares
are held for another reason – to provide a pool for issuing restricted stock or
options or because firm management thought its shares undervalued and a good
investment – and if we posit that these shares would be held irrespective of any
deferred compensation liabilities, then it does not make sense to effectively treat
these treasury shares as funding deferred compensation. Of course, we generally
cannot be certain whether there is or is not a connection absent an explicit tie, but
given the prevalence of informal funding arrangements, it seems sensible to assume
that unfunded liabilities are indeed unfunded.
2. COLI

The largest source of joint tax advantage in private-sector nonqualified
arrangements likely stems from the use of COLI to informally fund these plans. The
prevalence of COLI use is, in fact, consistent with a story in which plan sponsors fail
to minimize joint tax burdens through investment decisions. If, for example, firms
were using § 1032 to minimize the joint tax burden of nonqualified deferred

Recall that under § 1032 companies pay no tax on gains or losses on own-company stock.
See supra text accompanying note 55.
172 Infra text accompanying notes 212-217.
171
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compensation, there would be no need to purchase COLI. As noted, firms pay a price
to gain the COLI tax advantage, but apparently the tax benefit outweighs the cost at
many companies. And even if the potential COLI tax benefit is often not fully
realized because of premature policy liquidations, the use of COLI raises legitimate
tax policy concerns with respect to high-income taxpayer subsidy, cost to the public
fisc, and potential distortions in compensation design.

On the other hand, one could argue that the COLI tax advantage simply
parallels the tax benefit available to individuals who use life insurance products as
savings vehicles. 173 My impression is the use of COLI as an investment vehicle may
be more common than individual investment through insurance products, but it is
difficult to distinguish tax motivated individual investing from insurance
acquisition, and ultimately this is an empirical question. Moreover, whatever one
thinks of the market failure arguments put forward to justify tax preferences for
individual purchase of life insurance, these arguments do not extend to COLI. 174
One could also argue that the COLI issue is separable from the nonqualified
deferred compensation issue per se. COLI is widely used to fund various employee
benefits, such as health care benefits, and for other purposes, such as providing “key
man” insurance. 175

Nonetheless, I would argue that social welfare would be enhanced by limiting
or eliminating the tax benefits of COLI as used to fund nonqualified deferred
compensation and similar employee benefits. This is not the appropriate forum for
exhaustive prescription and analysis, so I will simply sketch out possible avenues of
attack. Luckily, several are already in the public record.

As discussed above, there are two main tax issues associated with COLI – the
underlying tax benefits of deferral and exemption and the additional tax arbitrage
associated with leveraged arrangements. Tax savings from direct leverage –
borrowing tied directly to cash value build up – have been all but eliminated. Under
current law, interest is deductible on no more than $50,000 of COLI-based debt with
Whole life and other long-term insurance arrangements involve a savings element in
addition to insurance. Investment gains under these policies are excluded from income
when received as death benefits, IRC § 101(a), and, although the rules are more complex, as
a practical matter, investment gains generally are excluded from income even when
amounts are withdrawn prior to death. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 165, at 159-61.
174 It is sometimes argued that individuals systematically underestimate the risk and cost of
death and that adverse selection undermines accurate insurance pricing, but these
concerns, even if valid, do not translate to COLI. WEBEL & MARPLES, supra note 147, at 6-7.
Of course, companies and insurance providers will argue that preferential COLI tax
treatment is needed to incent firms to provide nonqualified deferred compensation and
other employee benefits. But Congress has already decided that non-qualified plans should
not be tax advantaged, so this argument should carry little weight.
175 WEBEL & MARPLES, supra note 147, at 1.
173
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respect to at most 20 individuals at a particular company. 176 But indirect leverage is
still possible. Firms may borrow money for other purposes and deduct the interest
on those borrowing while simultaneously holding COLI policies with large cash
values. The Obama administration attempted to combat this indirect leverage by
limiting the deductibility of employer interest payments based on the ratio of COLI
cash values to total firm assets, whether or not the debt was incurred to purchase or
carry the COLI, and irrespective of the identity of the insured employees. 177 This
proposal has not been adopted by Congress but remains on the shelf.

The second COLI tax issue has to do with deferral of tax on investment
income and exclusion of death benefits, the “normal” tax preferences associated
with investing through insurance products. If one concludes that these preferences
are not warranted for COLI type arrangements, they should simply be eliminated.178
In 2003, Representative Rahm Emanuel offered legislation in the House that would
have done just that. Under that legislation, with certain specific exceptions for, e.g.,
“key man” insurance, employers would have been required to include income
earned on COLI products each year, and death benefits in excess of premiums paid
and gains already taxed would have been fully includable, as well. 179 If these
reforms were to be enacted, presumably COLI would disappear as a means of
informally funding nonqualified deferred compensation, while, of course, tax neutral
rabbi trusts would remain.
3. Low Marginal Tax Rate Employers
The use of nonqualified deferred compensation by governmental and other
formally tax-exempt organizations raises a distinct set of issues and is not a focus of
this Article. 180 However, the use of nonqualified deferred compensation by private

I.R.C. § 264(a)(4), (e) (2012). See also WEBEL & MARPLES, supra note 147, at 3-4.
Proposal to Modify the Tax Treatment of Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Continues to
Receive Attention, WR NEWSWIRE, AN AALU WASHINGTON REPORT (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://rosestreetadvisors.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/22/2016/02/022014ProposaltoModifytheTaxTreatmentofCOLICon
tinuetoReceiveAttention.pdf; WEBEL & MARPLES, supra note 147, at 4.
178 The use of COLI has already been circumscribed to some extent by recent legislation.
The “COLI Best Practices Act,” part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, restricts the full
tax advantage (tax free death benefits) to policies insuring directors, five percent owners,
and the 35% most highly compensated employees, and also requires employers to obtain
informed consent prior to taking on policies on insureds. I.R.C. § 101(j) (2012); Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-280, § 863(j), 120 Stat. 786 (Aug. 17, 2006).
179 H.R. 2127, 108th Congress, 1st Session (2003). See also WEBEL & MARPLES, supra note
147, at 11.
180 This is not to suggest that these issues are unimportant, and under recently proposed
regulations, their importance may grow. Unfunded, nonqualified deferred compensation
offered by tax-exempt entities (other than churches) is regulated under IRC § 457 and
consists of “eligible plans” regulated under § 457(b) and “ineligible plans” regulated under §
176
177
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sector firms that are effectively tax exempt, or that face low effective marginal tax
rates generally, is fair game and is potentially troubling from a tax policy
perspective. The returns on investments at these firms face little or no tax, which
might incent these firms to shift current compensation into deferred compensation,
and impose a cost on the public fisc that we might wish to recover through accrual
taxation or a special tax on nonqualified plan investment returns. 181

Further work is needed to determine how widespread a problem this really
is and whether the effort involved in specifying and identifying low marginal tax
rate companies and excessive use of nonqualified deferred compensation by these
companies would be worth it. 182 Preliminary investigation, however, suggests that

457(f). § 457(b) eligible plans provide limited deferral opportunities that mirror private
sector nonqualified deferred compensation, but, because the plan sponsor is tax-exempt, §
457(b) plans produce after-tax results similar to those achieved through qualified plans.
However, excluding “catch-ups,” the maximum § 457(b) contribution for 2015 was $18,000
per employee. IRS, PUB. NO. 4484, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES EMPLOYEE PLANS
(2015). § 457(f) ineligible plans provide for unlimited deferral, but taxation is imposed at
the point at which deferred amounts are no longer subject to a substantial risk or forfeiture
(SROF). See also Mark P. Altieri, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 75 CPA J. 54,
(2005); Kilgour, supra note 27, at 179. In the wake of the enactment of § 409A, which
incorporates a rather strict definition of SROF and IRS Notice 2007-62, which suggested an
intent to apply that definition to § 457(f) plans, some practitioners and commentators
assumed that elective deferred compensation would be taxed on an accrual basis (although
tax on the earnings would be deferred). Doran, supra note 12, at 5 n. 21; Polsky, supra note
40, at 640 n. 24. However, proposed regulations issued in June 2016 adopt a more flexible
definition of SROF, providing that certain non-competition agreements can create a SROF
and specifically recognizing that elective deferral is not inconsistent with a SROF in certain
situations. I.R.S. Reg. 147196-07, 2016-28 I.R.B. See also Amy S. Elliott & Andrew Velvarde,
Treasury Finally Issues Deferred Comp Rules for Tax-Exempts, 2016 TAX NOTES TODAY 120-1,
available at http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/benefits-and-pensions/treasuryfinally-issues-deferred-comp-rules-taxexempts/2016/06/22/18521201?highlight=treasury%20finally%20issues%20deferred%2
0comp%20rules (June 22, 2016). Assuming that the proposed regulations are adopted
essentially as drafted, we may see increased tax-advantaged deferrals by or on behalf of
exempt organization employees.
181 There is precedent for applying accrual taxation to nonqualified deferred compensation
paid by tax-indifferent organizations. See I.R.C. § 457(f) (including “ineligible” deferred
compensation of employees of tax-exempt entities in gross income in the first year in which
there is no substantial risk of forfeiture); § 457A (2012) (applying accrual taxation to
vested nonqualified deferred compensation paid by, e.g., foreign companies unless
substantially all income is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business or is subject to
a comprehensive foreign income tax). However, identification of effectively tax-exempt
domestic firms may be somewhat more difficult than identification of tax indifferent foreign
firms.
182 The existing literature examining the relationship between firm tax status and use of
nonqualified deferred compensation is slim and relies on rough proxies for company
marginal tax rates. These studies typically find no statistically significant relationship. See
Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence
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firms facing low effective marginal tax rates may not be exploiting the opportunity
to minimize their joint tax bills on executive retirement savings through use of
nonqualified deferred compensation.

I analyzed contributions to nonqualified defined contribution accounts for
fiscal year 2012 by the “top five” senior executives of the companies included in the
Compustat Execucomp database, and by employers on behalf of these executives. 183
Deferred compensation by and on behalf of these executives is reported in annual
proxy statements. For each firm, I calculated the aggregate of executive and
employer contributions as a fraction of aggregate total compensation for these
individuals. 184 Next, I accessed estimated U.S. effective marginal federal income tax
rates (EMTRs) for each firm from two sources: 1) estimates produced using the
methodology developed by Jennifer Blouin, John Core, and Wayne Guay and
provided in the Compustat database, 185 and 2) estimates determined by John
Graham, which are available through his website. 186 Although largely similar in
approach, the two sources often provide significantly different estimates. Given
this, I sorted the firms into three categories – those with a U.S. EMTR of 0.10 or less
according to the estimates of both Graham and Blouin, Core, and Guay (low EMTR
firms), those with an EMTR of 0.30 or more according to both estimates (high EMTR
firms), and all others. For the low EMTR group of firms, total NQDC contributions
averaged only 0.48% of total compensation (0 median), while total NQDC

from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 99 (2012) (including
NOL level and taxes paid as variables); Wei Cen, The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its
Components 30 (Working Paper, Jan. 2011) (employing an NOL indicator variable);
Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and its Role in
Managerial Compensation, 57 J. FIN. 1551, 1574, Table VI (2007) (same).
183 Of course, the five most highly compensated executives at each firm would generally be a
subset of the population eligible to participate in nonqualified deferred compensation
programs, but this is the only data that is publicly available. The Compustat Execucomp
database is accessible through the Wharton Research Data Service: https://wrdsweb.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
184 Total compensation is measured per Execucomp variable TDC1.
185 Jennifer Blouin et al., Have the Tax Benefits of Debt Been Overestimated?, 98 J. FIN. ECON.
195 (2010). In a nutshell, Blouin, Core, and Guay (BCG) develop a nonparametric (nonrandom walk) approach to estimating a firm’s future taxable income that can be used to
determine the total present value of current and future U.S. federal income taxes associated
with an additional dollar of income today. Using accounting data, they calculate effective
marginal tax rates both before and after deductions for interest, the latter being the
appropriate rate for incremental decision-making with respect to matters such as use of
nonqualified deferred compensation. The BCG effective marginal tax rate database is
available through Compustat. BCG’s estimation approach is a refinement of that developed
in John R. Graham, Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate, J. FIN. ECON. 41 (1996).
An implicit assumption in utilizing either BCG or Graham’s marginal tax rate data is that the
income generated on deferred compensation is taxed in the U.S. Given the effective
prohibition under I.R.C. § 409A on offshore rabbi trusts, this seems a reasonable
assumption, at least for a large fraction of deferred compensation.
186 https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/
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contributions averaged 4.24% of total pay for the high EMTR group of firms (0.68%
median). 187 Despite the potential joint tax advantage, participation in nonqualified
deferred compensation at low EMTR firms appears to be relatively meager. 188

I plan to investigate the relative paucity of nonqualified deferred
compensation participation at low marginal rate firms in future work, but three
potential explanations come immediately to mind. First, some firms with low
effective marginal rates may be on shaky ground financially, in which case
executives might be loath to defer current compensation in exchange for an
unsecured promise to pay in the future.
Second, nonqualified deferred
compensation use varies by industry and industry effects may explain part of the
picture. Third, consistent with recent survey evidence provided by John Graham,
Michelle Hanlon, Terry Shevlin, and Nemit Shroff, 189 some firms may not take their
low effective marginal tax rates into account in deciding how aggressively to push
nonqualified deferred compensation.
Further work may sharpen or even flip this picture. After controlling for firm
size, industry, etc., it may turn out that low effective marginal tax rate firms do
exploit the nonqualified deferred compensation opportunity. Even if that turns out
to be the case, however, as discussed below, it seems likely that shareholders enjoy
the benefit of the tax savings on deferred dollars at low marginal tax rate firms, not
plan participants. 190 If so, this distributional consequence would not alleviate all of
the concerns associated with tax-preferred nonqualified deferred compensation use
by low effective marginal tax rate employers but would mitigate the concern that
the subsidy flows to high-income taxpayers.
*****

With respect to taxable plan sponsors facing marginal tax rates at or near the
statutory maximum, and setting COLI use aside, nonqualified deferred
compensation in practice seems to yield little or no aggregate joint tax advantage.
The difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level. 62 firms satisfied the
low EMTR criteria; 492 satisfied the high EMTR criteria.
188 Data from other years yields a pattern that is generally consistent with the 2012 data
discussed herein.
189 John R. Graham et al., Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making (Working Paper, March
2016) (evaluating survey responses from tax executives at 500 companies subject to the
U.S. corporate tax and finding that most firms use either the U.S. statutory tax rate or their
GAAP effective tax rate (an average rate) instead of effective marginal tax rates in making
incremental decisions). To be sure, while statutory rates will generally be larger than
marginal rates, the GAAP effective rate can be larger or smaller than the marginal rate.
190 Infra Part IV(B) (arguing that nonqualified DC plan participants generally enjoy effective
above-market returns whether employed by tax-paying or effectively tax-exempt employers
and that shareholders bear the costs, if any, associated with taxation of gains on deferred
amounts held by employers).
187
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Of course, one might take a different tack entirely and argue that the policy
focus should be on potential joint tax advantage, not realized advantages. The fact
that a firm fails to realize a potential joint tax advantage in this area might simply
reflect better after-tax opportunities elsewhere. For example, firms that fail to fully
hedge nonqualified liabilities notionally invested in dividend paying equities seem
to be squandering the benefit of the dividend received deduction, but might just
have better uses for the funds.
One response to this line of argument is that firms often do set aside assets to
satisfy nonqualified plan liabilities and sometimes the result is a clear joint tax
disadvantage, such as when firms hedge notional investment in growth stocks with
taxable funds. Another response is that the concerns of those advocating for a
special tax or accrual taxation are less in evidence when, for example, a firm invests
freed up assets in its business generating robust but relatively high-tax returns
rather than hedging participant notional investments at relatively low rates. Where
is the cost to fisc, subsidy of high-earner savings, or distributional concern in that
scenario?
B. What Are the Distributional Consequences of Deferred Compensation?

Nonqualified defined contribution plan terms typically mirror those of
qualified plans, such as 401(k)s, promising participants returns on their notional
investments that are undiminished by tax during the deferral period; i.e., tax-free
growth. Nominally, participants gain an advantage – the difference between preand post-tax returns 191 - and shareholders bear the cost of providing this tax-free
investment growth to plan participants, to the extent that the firm incurs taxes on
the returns on the deferred dollars. Many plan sponsors also match participant
deferrals to some degree or make other contributions to nonqualified accounts. But
one may question whether or to what extent these benefits are shifted back to the
firm and shareholders through adjustments to other terms of compensation.
The short answer is that we don’t know the distributional consequences of
these arrangements. However, for several reasons, I am skeptical that the nominal
benefit of tax-free growth on deferred dollars is shifted away from plan participants.
First, the population of participants is heavily weighted in favor of a firm’s most

The advantage can be substantial when returns are substantial. Applying the
assumptions employed by Professors Halperin and Warren in their example, an executive
deferring compensation in a nonqualified plan operating under these terms could
accumulate 30% more assets over ten years than she could by investing after-tax pay in the
same instrument. See Appendix. To be sure, Halperin and Warren employ a 10% annual
pre-tax rate of return to simplify their example, a return that has not been generally
achievable for some time. On the other hand, they also assume a 30% individual marginal
tax rate, which exceeds the top effective rate on individual equity returns but is far less than
the current top effective rate on debt returns. The net advantage to participants in these
plans increases with pre-tax returns and with individual tax rates.
191
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highly compensated and most powerful employees. Second, the cost of providing
what are effectively above-market returns is not specifically disclosed to
shareholders. Firms are required to disclose above-market returns accruing on
deferred compensation accounts held by their most senior executives, but returns
that match those available under qualified plans are not considered above-market
returns for the purposes of these disclosures, even if plan sponsors incur greater
costs in delivering these returns on nonqualified accounts. 192 Third, DC plan
participation is largely elective and by no means universal. It would be difficult for
firms to adjust other terms of compensation to offset the deferred compensation
return advantage when less than half of eligible individuals elect to defer
compensation in any given year. 193 Fourth, some firms provide explicitly abovemarket returns on nonqualified deferred compensation. 194 It would seem odd for
firms subject to investor scrutiny to provide such visible benefits through the front
door and then to remove them surreptitiously through the back door. Fifth, to
repeat, most nonqualified DC participants are getting the same deal as 401(k)
participants. The dollars are larger and the firm tax consequences are less
favorable, but firms are unlikely to adjust other terms of employment to offset this
obscure advantage when the arrangement seems comparable on the surface to a
401(k).
Of course, at firms that are effectively tax-exempt or that face very low
effective marginal rates, there would be little or no cost to providing tax-free growth
on nonqualified deferred compensation dollars for the shareholders to bear. But I
see no reason to think that plan participants would realize a better deal at these
firms; no reason, in other words, to think that the firm-level tax benefit would flow
through to participants. Of course, it might. Plans might be more generous or other
compensation terms more generous at these firms, reflecting the tax savings on
nonqualified deferred compensation, but this seems unlikely. Absent evidence to
this effect, it seems sensible to assume that shareholders, not participants, enjoy the
tax savings at these firms.
In sum, it seems likely that DC plan participants enjoy returns that are
undiminished by tax during the deferral period. In some cases, providing this return
results in no cost to shareholders. This would be the case at effectively tax-exempt
firms and at tax paying firms to the extent that participants and sponsors take

SEC, REG. S-K, COMPLIANCE & DISCLOSURE INTERPRETATIONS § 219.01 (Jan. 24, 2007) (“A
registrant need not report earnings on compensation that is deferred on a basis that is not
tax qualified as above-market or preferential earnings within the meaning of Item
402(c)(2)(viii)(B) where the return on such earnings is calculated in the same manner and
at the same rate as earnings on externally managed investments to employees participating
in a tax-qualified plan providing for broad-based employee participation.”).
193 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 21 (reporting that 46% of eligible individuals
elected to defer compensation in 2013).
194 In my sample of 40 S&P 500 companies with active nonqualified deferred compensation
plans, two provided explicitly above-market returns.
192
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advantage of IRC § 1032. In other cases, shareholders likely bear a cost that may be
relatively low (e.g., when COLI products are employed) or quite significant (e.g.,
when participant accounts are hedged with taxable investment in securities.

I also suspect, but am less confident, that employer matching contributions
made to nonqualified DC accounts are not offset by other terms of employment. All
of the arguments favoring participant retention of above-market returns apply to
employer contributions except for their visibility. These contributions, to the extent
received by the NEOs, are explicitly disclosed in a prominent table in company
proxy statements. In this sense, matching contributions are similar to other
perquisites that are received by senior executives and are disclosed. The difference,
I think, is that executive participation in qualified 401(k) and nonqualified 401(k)
supplemental programs seems egalitarian compared to many disclosed perks, such
as use of company cars and planes. As a result, investors may be more likely to view
company matching dollars as an expected incident of employment, not an added
give-away to executives.
The distributional consequences of nonqualified DB plans are also somewhat
unclear, but it remains likely that participants win, while shareholders lose or break
even. As with nonqualified DC plans, nonqualified DB plans often mirror the terms
of the corresponding qualified DB plans. The terms of the plans incorporate the tax
advantages of qualified plans. And, again, other compensation terms are unlikely to
be adjusted because the benefit is not disclosed and is obscure, and because
participation is focused at the top of the corporate hierarchy. On the other hand,
nonqualified DB plans tend not to be elective, making it easier for employers to
adjust other terms of employment, if they were to choose to do so.

To be sure, nonqualified plan participants pay a price for their above-market
returns and employer matching dollars. Even if their notional investments are
diversified, these individuals remain unsecured creditors and face the risk of total
loss of nonqualified benefits in the event of company bankruptcy. And, given
§ 409A, it is much more difficult to protect against this possibility than it was
formerly. 195 However, participation in nonqualified plans is almost entirely
voluntary. Use of these plans indicates that the perceived benefits outweigh the
risks. 196

C. What Role Do Taxes Play in the Adoption or Operation of Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Arrangements?

Supra Part I(C).
Should the SEC mandate disclosure of effective above-market returns provided to
nonqualified deferred compensation participants? In principle, they should, but estimation
of the benefit would be complex as it depends on rates of return achieved over the deferral
period as well as on current and projected individual tax rates. Given the apparently limited
impact of executive pay disclosures on the magnitude of executive pay (see Walker, supra
note 75, at 246), it is not clear that the benefits of such disclosure would justify the costs.
195
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Consistent with the forgoing analysis, I see little evidence suggesting that the
joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements are of
first order importance in the decision to offer these plans or in the selection of
investments. If joint tax consequences were the driving force one would expect to
see programs structured to encourage notional and actual investment in the types of
instruments that yield a large joint tax advantage – company stock, income stocks,
and debt securities. But there is little evidence of this. Own-company stock appears
to be used at least as commonly in qualified plans, where § 1032 provides no
incremental benefit, as in nonqualified plans. 197 Sources suggested that typical
nonqualified DC notional investment portfolios are somewhat more debt heavy than
those found in 401(k)s. This might suggest tax-motivated allocation of debt
instruments to nonqualified plans, but these allocations are also consistent with
shorter expected investment horizons for riskier unsecured nonqualified plan
investment, so this is not strong evidence that taxation is of first order importance.
There is no evidence suggesting that income stocks represent a greater proportion
of nonqualified plan portfolios than they do of retirement portfolios more generally.
All indications suggest that DC plan notional investment menus are designed to
meet the long-term savings needs of participants, nothing more.

When asked whether “compensat[ing] executives in a more tax-efficient
manner,” was an important goal for their nonqualified benefits programs, 18% of
respondents to the Newport Group’s survey reported that this was critical, while
52% rated this goal as very important. 198 My source at the Newport Group
explained, however, that this goal referred to tax efficiency from the executives’
perspective. 199 Firms think it important to provide their executives and highly
compensated employees with expanded qualified plan-type savings opportunities.
This was not meant to be a question about joint tax consequences, and my contact
did not think it likely that survey respondents interpreted it that way. 200

Having decided to offer a nonqualified plan, joint tax considerations clearly
play an important role, at a certain level. Companies will not intentionally
trigger § 409A, and sources reported that consulting opportunities have increased
in the wake of § 409A’s enactment, given the additional complexity and high stakes
associated with missteps. 201 Reportedly, the use of COLI boils down to simple
economics, trading off the tax benefits of COLI against its cost and other constraints.

However, as noted above, notional investment choices and actual use of
deferred amounts do not reflect joint tax minimization. In this area as in many
others, accounting considerations appear to be as or more important than tax.
Infra text accompanying notes 212-214.
Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 7.
199 Shannon Interview, supra note 103.
200 Shannon Interview, supra note 103.
201 Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39.
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Professor Doran has suggested that another tax rule, IRC § 162(m), could
help explain the prevalence of nonqualified deferred compensation. 202 Under
§ 162(m), the deduction for non-performance based compensation paid to a public
company’s CEO and the three most highly compensated executives other than the
CEO is limited to $1 million per executive per year. Deferring salary or other nonperformance-based compensation in excess of $1 million until an executive is no
longer one of these “covered employees” would allow a firm to deduct otherwise
nondeductible pay. Doran also notes that executives who are residents of states
with high state income tax rates can defer compensation until they retire to a low
(or no) tax state and reduce or eliminate the state income tax burden. 203

It is certainly possible that these tax rules influence the use of nonqualified
deferred compensation. Indeed, it seems likely that executives would take potential
state income tax burdens into account in their personal planning. I am somewhat
skeptical that § 162(m) plays a significant role, given that it applies only to four
individuals at each company, that most compensation other than annual salary can
be readily designed to satisfy the “performance based” exception to nondeductibility, and the fact that participants, not firms, generally elect whether to
defer compensation and for how long. But these are empirical questions, and, in any
event, even if nonqualified deferred compensation is being used to maximize
deductibility under § 162(m) or avoid state income taxes, it’s not clear that either
would justify reform of deferred compensation taxation, per se. 204
D. Why (Else) Do Firms Offer Nonqualified Deferred Compensation?

Over 80% of firms responding to the Newport Group’s survey reported that it
was critical or very important “to allow executives to accumulate assets for their
financial planning needs” and “to have a compensation program that is competitive
with peer companies.” 205
Interview responses supported paternalism and
competition as the leading drivers of nonqualified programs. 206 But sources also
suggested that these programs are in flux. Paternalism may remain an important
factor in some industries (utilities were frequently mentioned) but less so for start-

Doran, supra note 62.
Doran, supra note 62, at 23-24 (describing the federal legislation that protects certain
retirement income from out-of-state taxation). See also supra note 107 (discussing how the
details of this statute may influence the design of nonqualified DC plans).
204 As Doran notes, and as others have recognized, the limitation on deductibility under
§ 162(m) is poor tax policy. Full deductibility of compensation is consistent with general
tax principles, and the § 162(m) limitation was a misguided attempt to shape compensation
practices through the tax code. Doran, supra note 62 at 51. Doran finds avoidance of state
tax more objectionable, and I agree, but arguably the root problem is the federal law that
pre-empts out-of-state taxation of certain retirement income. Id. at 23.
205 Newport Group Survey, supra note 37, at 7.
206 Interview with Executive Benefits Consultants with an International Firm, supra note 39
(competition); Telephone Interview with Michael T. Schoonmaker, Principal, Ernst & Young
[hereinafter Schoonmaker Interview] (Feb. 23, 2016) (paternalism).
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ups and firms in the tech and financial industries. 207 Rational, utility-maximizing
executives should not need a company-sponsored plan to put away assets for
retirement or college expenses.

On the other hand, if I am right about the distributional effects of
nonqualified plans, participants enjoy an opportunity to invest on terms that are not
generally available. Recall that plans do not merely provide participants with the
after-tax returns achievable by their employers on deferred sums, but returns that
are wholly undiminished by tax during the deferral period. As detailed in the
Appendix, applying the assumptions employed by Professors Halperin and Warren
in their example, an executive deferring compensation in a nonqualified plan
operating under these terms could accumulate 30% more assets over ten years than
she could by investing after-tax pay in the same instrument. 208 Moreover, it is
certainly not a bad thing, from the perspective of boards and executives, that the
opportunity to achieve tax-free growth on nonqualified deferred compensation
portfolios does not factor into the calculation of total “top 5” compensation that is
prominently disclosed in annual proxy statements. While this paper does not argue
that managerial power drives the use of nonqualified deferred compensation, the
failure to treat this yield advantage as an above-market return requiring disclosure
under SEC rules is consistent with the preference for low salience pay under the
managerial power view. 209

Path dependence may also play a role. Nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements date back at least to World War II when top individual tax rates
peaked at 94%, while corporate tax rates topped out at 40%. 210 Although usage of
nonqualified deferred compensation remained fairly modest prior to the adoption of
qualified plan limitations in the 1980s, 211 companies and executives would have
enjoyed large joint tax advantages on nonqualified arrangements throughout this
period. Today, absent COLI, that driving force is often lacking, but once a
compensation practice that benefits executives has become commonplace, it can be

Schoonmaker Interview, supra note 206.
As noted supra, Halperin and Warren employ a 10% annual pre-tax rate of return to
simplify their example, a return that has not been generally achievable for some time. On
the other hand, they also assume a 30% individual marginal tax rate, which exceeds the top
effective rate on individual equity returns but is far less than the current top effective rate
on debt returns. The net advantage to participants in these plans increases with pre-tax
returns and with individual tax rates.
209 See supra note 76 for a very brief description of the managerial power view of the
processes involved in setting executive compensation.
210 Christopher Drew & David Cay Johnston, Special Tax Breaks Enrich Savings of Many in
the Ranks of Management, NYT (Oct. 13, 1996) (noting that “many companies began letting
executives defer pay as the highest tax rate surged from 7 percent to 94 percent during
World War II).
211 Id. (discussing the adoption of limitations on 401(k) contributions in 1986 and on
pension plans in 1988 and 1993).
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difficult to eradicate, particularly when the benefits are poorly disclosed and not
salient.

Finally, while I am skeptical that executives can accurately predict their
future marginal tax rates, elective plans do provide participants an opportunity to
make a bet on lower individual rates at retirement (either due to a change in the
brackets or their position within the brackets), if they wish to do so. Some
executives might find this option to be valuable, and firms might respond to
executives’ demand for that option.
E. A Final Mystery? Relative Use of Own-Company Stock in Qualified and
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans

It is interesting to compare notional investment of nonqualified deferred
compensation in own-company stock and informal funding of nonqualified plan
obligations with own-company stock with qualified plan investment in owncompany stock. Historically, at least, one would find as much or more own-company
stock in qualified as in nonqualified plans. Between 1985 and 1998, 14% of total DC
qualified plan assets of a broad sample of firms were invested in own-company
stock on average. 212 In 2002, more than 50% of employee assets were invested in
own-company stock at 18 of the largest 100 corporate qualified DC plan
sponsors. 213 In 2005, 17% of participants in qualified DC plans administered by
Vanguard had over 20% of their balances invested in company stock. 214

From a joint tax perspective, this seems odd. There is a significant cost in
terms of lost diversification to investing in own-company stock, 215 a cost that should
dampen the appetite for own-company stock in retirement plans. While § 1032
results in a joint tax advantage for own-company stock investment in nonqualified
plans, and could offset the diversification cost to some degree, it provides no
incremental benefit for own-company stock placed in qualified plans. 216 Qualified
plan trust assets grow tax free in any event. 217 Of course, not all employees have

Joshua D. Rauh, Own Company Stock in Defined Contribution Pension Plans: A Takeover
Defense?, 81 J. FIN ECON. 379, 388, table 3 (2006).
213 Rauh, supra note 212, at 382.
214 STEPHEN P. UTKUS & JEAN A. YOUNG, VANGUARD GROUP, THE EVOLUTION OF COMPANY STOCK IN
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 5 (May 2014). Holdings of company stock in qualified DC plans
has declined since the enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which requires
public company plan sponsors to allow participants to diversify employer stock
contributions after three years and their own contributions at any time. 26 C.F.R. §
1.401(a)(35)-1 (2016); UTKUS & YOUNG, supra, at 3.
215 Benartzi et al., supra note 74, at 50, put the cost at roughly fifty cents on the dollar.
216 Halperin & Warren, supra note 32, at 326 (noting that the relative advantage created by
qualified plan exemption of investment returns depends on the tax treatment of an asset
class outside of a qualified plan).
217 During the deferral period, earnings on own-company stock face a zero tax rate whether
held in a qualified plan trust or in a segregated account informally funding a nonqualified
212
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access to both qualified and nonqualified plans, but from a joint tax perspective it is
surprising that own-company stock would be used as or more heavily in qualified
plans as in nonqualified plans.

A number of commentators have attempted to explain the use of owncompany stock in qualified plans. At one level, the use is attributable to employer
contributions in stock and to plan structures, such as defaults, that encourage
employee investment in stock. 218 But why do firms structure plans in this way and
why do employees accept these defaults, given the cost to diversification?
Professors Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein conclude that employees
underestimate the risk of holding employer stock while employers overestimate the
benefits in terms of enhanced productivity. 219 But if so, why are notional
nonqualified plan investments in company stock lower? Is it because more
sophisticated executives are more sensitive to the value of diversification?

Professor Joshua Rauh has offered a corporate governance explanation for
the use of company stock in qualified plans. 220 He observed that stock held in
qualified plan accounts is in friendly hands in the event of a corporate control
contest as workers, who may fear job losses, are likely to vote with management.
Rauh found that state law changes that increased takeover protections were
associated with reduced own-company stockholdings in 401(k)s. 221

While Benartzi and colleagues conclude that the magnitude of Rauh’s results
was not large, 222 Rauh’s story could help explain why a relative tax advantage fails
to drive own-company stock out of qualified plans and into nonqualified plans.
Unlike own-company stock held in a qualified plan trust that would be voted by the
trustee (or the employee if the vote is passed along), notional investment in
employer stock within a nonqualified plan is simply a bookkeeping entry that
affords no voting rights. Moreover, any funds set aside by the sponsor and actually
invested in own-company stock yields non-voting Treasury stock. In short, owncompany stock “investment” in nonqualified plans provides no takeover protection.

On the other hand, the accounting impediments – the inability to hedge
income statement volatility arising from participant notional investment in owncompany stock in nonqualified DC plans – are not a factor with respect to actual
investment in employer stock within qualified plans. There is both more of a pull
plan liability. The difference is that other asset classes are also zero taxed while held in
qualified plan trusts but face positive tax rates backing nonqualified plan obligations, unless
a COLI is used.
218 Rauh, supra note 212, at 380.
219 Benartzi et al., supra note 74, at 68.
220 Rauh, supra note 212, at 390.
221 Rauh, supra note 212, at 380.
222 Benartzi et al., supra note 74, at 61.
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(entrenchment) and less of a brake (accounting) associated with own-company
stock investment in qualified plans. 223
V. Conclusion

The real world tax consequences of complex nonqualified deferred
compensation programs depend significantly on employer and employee practices.
Unfortunately, currently mandated corporate disclosures shed only limited light
upon these practices. However, interviews with participants and industry surveys
provide insights that suggest that the joint tax consequences of nonqualified
deferred compensation are mixed, at least with respect to programs sponsored by
taxable and tax-paying employers. The use of corporate owned life insurance as an
informal funding vehicle for nonqualified deferred compensation results in a joint
tax advantage, of greater or lesser extent depending on when policies are cashed in,
but funding liabilities with taxable securities or plowing deferred amounts back into
the business is as likely to result in a joint tax disadvantage as an advantage. This
evidence suggests that, while COLI use and taxation may deserve another look by
policy makers, the driving force behind fundamental reform of nonqualified
deferred compensation taxation may be limited. Moreover, while loss firms facing
low effective marginal rates can create a joint tax advantage through use of
nonqualified deferred compensation, preliminary investigation suggests that they
rarely do so. Perhaps the heightened risk associated with an unsecured promise to
pay outweighs the potential tax savings at loss firms.
Even if nonqualified deferred compensation does not turn out to be a
substantial drain on the public fisc, this Article has argued that it likely provides an
undisclosed advantage to corporate executives, as it provides what are effectively
above-market returns on retirement savings. As a result, it appears that
shareholders, not taxpayers, often subsidize nonqualified deferred compensation.
The SEC should consider revising its rules to mandate disclosure of this advantage.

223 There are other differences that might help explain greater use of employer stock in
qualified plans, and two of them are tax differences. First, in-kind distributions of company
stock from 401(k)s may be tax preferred. In a nutshell, if company stock held in a qualified
plan is delivered to a participant as stock, only the market value at the time of the
contribution is taxed as ordinary income; gains are taxed as capital gains and are deferred
until disposition. By contrast, proceeds received on the distribution of mutual funds held in
401(k) and other qualified plans (that are not Roth plans) are fully taxed at ordinary income
rates when withdrawn from the plan (or from a rollover IRA). I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(B) (2012);
Benartzi et al., supra note 74, at 50. Second, employers can deduct certain reinvested
dividends paid on stock held in qualified plan trusts. I.R.C. § 404(k) (2012); Benartzi et al.,
supra note 74, at 59-60. On balance, however, the similarities and differences in the use of
employer stock in qualified and nonqualified plans reinforce the conclusion that joint tax
consequences are second order considerations in the operation of these plans.

52

Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Appendix
Illustration of the joint tax consequences of nonqualified deferred
compensation from Halperin & Warren (2014) at 328. (The following example is
simplified, excluding the demonstration that the timing of the employer’s deduction
does not affect the joint tax consequences.)224
Employee E has the opportunity to receive $100,000 in current
compensation from employer ER, when E’s tax rate on all sources of
income and gain is 30% and ER’s is 20%. If E invested the after-tax
amount ($70,000) at an annual pretax return of 10%, E would have
$137,701 in ten years ($70,000 X 1.0710).
Now suppose that E agreed to forgo $100,000 in current
compensation in exchange for a payment in ten years. ER’s deduction
is deferred as required by current law. Holding ER’s Year 0 position
constant, ER can set aside $80,000 in Year 0, which would compound
to $172,714 ($80,000 X 1.0810) in ten years. That amount would
permit ER to pay E a deferred amount of $215,892 after taking into
account the tax benefit ($43,178) of the compensation deduction,
leaving EE with $151,124 after tax.

The advantage to E from deferral is $13,423 ($151,124 $137,701), which is due to the investment compounding at the
employer’s after-tax rate rather than the employee’s after-tax rate
(that is, $70,000 X (1.0810 - 1.0710) = $13,423).

In practice, employers often promise nonqualified plan participants returns
that are equivalent to those achievable with qualified plans, i.e., returns
undiminished by tax during the deferral period. Assuming that costs and benefits
are not redistributed through other terms of compensation, the impact on E and ER
in Halperin and Warren’s example scenario would be as follows.
E agrees to forgo $100,000 in current compensation in
exchange for a payment in ten years. The notional investment
compounds at a 10% rate yielding $259,374 at payout ($100,000 X
1.1010), leaving E with $181,562 after taxes, an advantage of $43,861
(or 32%) versus E’s outside investment opportunity.

The after-tax cost to ER of providing a payment of $259,374 is
$207,499, resulting in a $34,785 (20%) funding shortfall versus the
$172,714 compound after-tax balance on the set aside funds.

Halperin and Warren provide a corresponding algebraic demonstration. Halperin &
Warren, supra note 32, at 328-29 n. 33.
224
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